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I. INTRODUCTION
Injuries to employees from accidents or assaults are certainly not
uncommon bases for recovery under Texas Law.' Along with occu-
pational diseases, these injuries form the principal causes for claims
under the Workers Compensation Act [hereinafter cited as the
"Act"]. 2 Generally, the largest body of compensation law deals with
accidents resulting in either temporary or permanent disability.
Under certain circumstances, however, the issue of disability or eligi-
bility for recovery is subordinate to the threshold inquiry of whether
the accident is one which is, in fact, the subject of the Act or which
may be attributed to activity not contemplated by the Act.
3
Recovery for an injury caused by a third person is dependent
1. E.g., Walters v. American States Ins. Co., 654 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1983) (claim for
workers compensation benefits brought by survivors of an employee who had been shot and
killed)..
2. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967).
3. Id. The general statutory exceptions involve injuries sustained as a result of acts of
God; assaults committed by third persons for reasons not arising from employment; injuries
while intoxicated; and injuries resulting from the employee's intent to injure himself or an-
other. Id. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Gregory, 521 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th District] 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 530 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1975).
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upon the reason for the third party's actions.4 If unrelated to the em-
ployee's employment, the injury is not compensable; conversely, if re-
lated to employment, the injury is compensable. The problem arises
when the identity and motivation of the assailant are unknown to
both parties.' When the circumstances of the accident or injury sus-
tained are largely unknown or unexplained, the problem of determin-
ing compensability is measurably increased.
The absence of the identity and motivation of the assailant sug-
gest other problems as well, such as the extent to which death or in-
jury can be accurately characterized as the result of an accident or an
assault in the unexplained case. For instance, in some unexplained
death cases the appearance of accident commonly associated with the
risks attendant to the employee's work may well mask an intentional
assault committed by another. Similarly, some apparent assaults may
result in recovery because the circumstances of the assault may sug-
gest a relationship to the employment as logically as to the lack of
one. Allocation of the burden of proof in these problem situtations
will ultimately prove determinative of whether recovery is authorized.
II. ACCIDENTS ARISING FROM THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF
EMPLOYMENT
As a general principle, any injury sustained by an employee while
acting in the course and scope of his employment is compensable
under the Act.6 However, the statutory definition of injury provides
for certain exclusions to the general rule if the injury is
Caused by the employee's wilful intention and attempt to injure
himself, or to unlawfully injure some other person, but shall in-
clude all other injuries of every kind and character having to do
with and originating in the work, business, trade, or profession of
the employer received by an employee while engaged in or about
the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer whether
upon the employer's premises or elsewhere.7
The definition provides for a general principle favoring coverage ex-
4. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967), provides in pertinent part:
The term "injury sustained in the course of employment," as used in this Act, shall
not include: "(2) . . . An injury caused by an Act of a third person intended to
injure the employee because of reasons personal to him and not directed against him
as an employee, or because of his employment." Id.
5. E.g., Walters, 654 S.W.2d at 423.
6. American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 149 Tex. 1, 227 S.W.2d 788 (1950).
7. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(4) (Vernon 1967).
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cept when the injury is the result of the employee's intention to injure
himself or another. While there are other recognized statutory modi-
fications of the general rule,' the definitional language provides a
guide which broadly encompasses all injuries sustained by the em-
ployee while at work.
The types of limitations which restrict recovery for accidental
injury do not usually involve a failure to establish the relationship
between the injury-producing event and the employee's performance
of duties encountered in employment, although that is generally the
case in unexplained accident cases. Rather, the source of exclusion
typically lies in failure to bring that relationship within the parame-
ters of the Act. For instance, an injury sustained by an employee
while going to or coming from work is generally excluded from cover-
age by the terms of the Act.9 This is true even though a clear relation-
ship between the injury-producing event and the employee's work can
be demonstrated. Unless travel is a condition of employment or the
transportation of the employee is provided for, paid for, or controlled
by the employer, an injury sustained in travel generally is not com-
pensated."° The concept of travel as a condition of employment, how-
ever, may be construed to include travel by the employee at the
direction of the employer, even though regular travel is not an intrin-
sic feature of the occupation.1'
The interplay between the travel exclusion and unexplained cases
is suggested by the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Freeman v.
Texas Compensation Insurance Co. 12 The employee in Freeman was
essentially directed by his employer to travel to a polygraph exam-
iner's office to be tested regarding allegations of misconduct by the
8. For example, article 8309, § 1(3) (Vernon 1967) excludes compensation for an "in-
jury received while in a state of intoxication." Id. § 1(3).
9. American States Ins. Co. v. Caddell, 644 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no
writ). See Southerland v. Christian, Inc., 629 P.2d 799 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981); but c.f Note,
Injuries Sustained by an Employee While Traveling to and from Work are Compensable: and
Within the Dual Purpose Exception to the Going and Coming Rule Where the Home has been
Established as a Second Jobsite, the Business Purpose of the Journey is Concurrent with that of
the Personal Purpose and There is an Incidental Benefit to the Employer-Bramall v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Board (Cal. Ct. App. 1978), 27 DRAKE L. REV. 769 (1977-78).
10. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309 § 1(4) (Vernon 1967).
11. See Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Knipe, 150 Tex. 313, 239 S.W.2d 1006 (1951);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 142 Tex. 370, 178 S.W.2d 514 (1944); Federal Underwriters
Exch. v. Lehers, 132 Tex. 140, 120 S.W.2d 791 (1938); Consolidated Underwriters v. Breed-
love, 114 Tex. 172, 265 S.W. 128 (1924); 1 A. LARSON, The Law of Workmen's Compensation
§ 16.10 (1984).
12. 603 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. 1980).
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employee.Ia The court considered the employee to have been involved
in a "special mission,"14 undertaken at the direction of his employer,
when he was killed in an automobile accident on his way from the
examiner's office after the test had been completed. Under the facts of
the case and characterization of the travel as a special mission, the
court held the deceased's beneficiaries were entitled to recovery. 15
Normally, an employee on his way home from work would not have
been entitled to the same consideration under the Act.1 6 Freeman
suggests, at least by inference, that the special mission concept may
result in somewhat greater protection for the employee in returning
home from a place other than his usual place of employment. 7
A second aspect of Freeman concerns the unexplained nature of
the employee's death. The traffic accident involved only the em-
ployee's vehicle and the defense suggested that the defendant had a
suicidal intent, perhaps linked to the reasons for the polygraph exami-
nation. 8 The evidence, however, was considered insufficient to raise a
defensive issue of self-infliction of the fatal wounds as an alternative
explanation to accident for the jury's consideration. 9
Another source of exclusion exists when the injury is the product
of a random accident having been caused by a natural disaster. In
this type of case, the injury is not the result of a risk to which the
employee is subjected by virtue of his employment, rather, the risk of
injury exists irrespective of any particular employment or the work of
any individual employee.2° It appears, however, that the consensus
on this theory of exclusion is marginal and limited to those cases of
13. Id. at 191.
14. Id. at 192 (interpreting TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967),
relating to the special mission concept). The Freeman court cited with approval: Texas Em-
ployers Ins. Ass'n v. Knipe, 150 Tex. 313, 239 S.W.2d 1006 (1951); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Nelson, 142 Tex. 370, 178 S.W.2d 514 (1944); Federal Underwriters Exch. v. Lehers, 132 Tex.
140, 120 S.W.2d 791 (1938); Consolidated Underwriters v. Breedlove, 114 Tex. 172, 265 S.W.
128 (1924). See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 16.10.
15. 603 S.W.2d at 193.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 192.
18. Id. at 193. The carrier sought to introduce at trial testimony by the deceased em-
ployee's former coworkers which purportedly demonstrated his suicidal tendencies. The
supreme court held that these statements were properly excluded by the trial court as too
remote in time to show suicide as a viable explanation for the employee's state of mind at the
time of the fatal accident. Id.
19. Id.
20. This example contemplates injuries resulting from what are commonly called "acts of
God" as well as those which are merely acts of nature.
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true natural disater, rather than the majority of less significant actions
common in nature. For example, in Standard Fire Insurance Co. v.
Cuellar,2 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a truck driver
was entitled to recover under the Act for injury suffered as a result of
an insect sting sustained while operating his truck. The court held
that the bite originated in the claimant's employment, stating:
The evidence establishes that the insect bite sustained by Cuellar
resulted from the effort on his part to discharge in an orderly way
the duties of his employment. He was stung while in the perform-
ance of his duties of employment, and he was subjected to this risk
by carrying out his designated duties. We think it clear that the
insect sting was a risk or hazard of his employment and is
compensable.22
This expression of the relationship between the accident-causing in-
jury and employment is characteristic of the courts' liberal interpreta-
tion of the compensation statute.23 Nevertheless, it is clear that if the
accident-producing injury can be termed a risk or hazard of employ-
ment in any sense, sympathetic courts will strain to find the connec-
tion and order compensation. For example, in Deatherage v.
International Insurance Company,24 the Texas Supreme Court held
that an employee killed as a result of an apparent accidental fire was
entitled to coverage under the Act when it was almost factually im-
possible to establish that the death occurred while the employee, a
caretaker/security guard at an unused plant, was acting in the course
and scope of his employment.
21. 468 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
22. Id. at 883.
23. Cuellar is not unique in interpreting the relationship of the accident to the employ-
ment liberally to support an award. A Colorado court, construing its statute in Kitchens v.
Department of Labor and Employment, 29 Colo. App. 374, 486 P.2d 474 (1971), upheld an
employee's award based on injuries sustained when a co-worker accidentally discharged his
hunting rifle while both were awaiting transport to the job site provided by their employer. 29
Colo. App. at -, 486 P.2d at 475. Similarly, a worker injured by sniper fire-apparently
unrelated to employment-from an adjacent building while at work was entitled to compensa-
tion benefits under the Kansas statute. Hensley v. Glass, 226 Kan. 256, 597 P.2d 641 (1979)
(construing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (1978)). Not all accidental shootings have been traced
to hazards of employment, and awards in other cases have been denied. See, e.g., West Tree
Serv. Inc. v. Hopper, 244 Ark. 348, 425 S.W.2d 300 (an eye injury from the firing of a rifle by
the employee before the employee had been ordered back to work following lunch held not to
have arisen out of employment); Ward v. Halliburton, Co., 76 N.M. 463, 415 P.2d 847 (1966)
(employee fatally shot by a jostled shotgun in his trunk as he was placing his uniform in his
trunk held not compensable).




The difficulties posed by cases in which the source of injury is
unexplained arise primarily because of the difficulty many courts ex-
perience in attempting to ascribe to the employment situation the risk
or hazard of a truly unexplained accident.25 As long as the source of
injury is known, the appellate courts can struggle with precedent in
applying some standard to the determination of the work relationship
of the injury-producing event to the employment. When the exact
nature of the accident is unknown, however, a court is deprived of
this starting point in the sequence, and the connection must be arrived
at by means of presumption, if at all.
The unexplained accident case may arise in one of two ways.
First, the nature of the accident itself may be unknown, thus provid-
ing no basis for understanding whether the accident could have arisen
in the course and within the scope of the employee's employment.
26
Second, the nature of the accident may be determinable, but the caus-
ative factor remains unsolved. Thus, for example, in Deatherage the
evidence demonstrated that the employee was killed in a fire. How-
ever, the origin, cause, and even the possible criminal reason for the
fire were unknown to the claimant.
27
Deatherage and Freeman serve to demonstrate another interest-
ing aspect of the unexplained accident cases. Substantial case law has
arisen in the context of conditions of employment which require the
25. The court of appeals, in ordering a new trial on remand following the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Deatherage observed:
The requirements of the statute are not satisfied by proof that injury occurred while
the workman was engaged in or about the furtherance of his employer's affairs or
business. He must also show that the injury was of a kind and character that had to
do with and originated in the employer's work trade business or profession.
628 S.W.2d at 210 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The court explained further:
An injury has to do with, and arises out of the work or business of the employer,
when it results from a risk or hazard which is necessarily, or ordinarily, or reason-
ably inherent in or incident to the conduct of such work or business. Compensation
law protects the employee against the risk or hazard taken in order to perform the
employer's task.
Id. at 211.
26. The difficulties inherent to unexplained death cases have given rise to the presump-
tion that:
When an employee is found dead at a place where his duties require him to be, or
where he might properly have been in the performance of his duties, during the hours
of his work, it has been said that in the absence of evidence that he was not engaged
in his master's business, there is [sic] presumption that the accident arose out of and
in the course of employment within the meaning of the compensation statute.
Scott v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 524 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex. 1975).
27. 628 S.W.2d at 210-11.
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individual employee to perform his duties in an isolated capacity.
Two bodies of case law are apparent: one, which involves employees
who work in the capacity of night watchmen or caretakers; 28 the
other involving employees who are injured while traveling in the per-
formance of their duties and suffer their accidents while alone.29
These two general types of situations contain one common denomina-
tor: the injury-producing event occurs in a situation in which the in-
jured employee is essentially alone and no managerial, fellow
employee, or nonemployee witnesses are present who can provide di-
rect testimony concerning the event.
A. Special Cases-Night Watchmen and Caretakers
Employees who are required to live on the premises of the em-
ployer or at the job site often perform their duties in isolation from
other employees or managerial personnel because their function is to
guard or watch property which is not in continual use by the em-
ployer.30 As a consequence, injuries sustained by these employees
may be difficult to trace to a particular risk or hazard associated with
their duties because their duties will often encompass routine aspects
of daily living. Larson, a leading commentator on the subject, ex-
presses a general principle which recognizes this factor of the care-
taker's employment activity:
When an employee is required to live on the premises, either by his
contract of employment or by the nature of the employment, and is
continuously on call [regardless of whether actually on duty], the
entire period of his presence on the premises pursuant to this re-
quirement is deemed included in this course of employment.3 '
Deatherage looked to the policy underlying Larson's suggested rule
and held that the fact of the employee's presence on the property con-
ferred a benefit to the employer and, hence, the activity of the em-
28. See generally 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, §§ 10.32, 24.10, 24.32 (caretaker case law).
29. Injuries sustained while traveling are compensable only if the travel falls within one
of the statutory exceptions to the travel exclusion. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb
(Vernon 1967); Freeman, 603 S.W.2d at 192. See also Caddell, 644 S.W.2d at 887 (injury or
death occurring in the use of the public street or highways going to or from the place of
enjoyment not compensable).
30. See Deathereage, 615 S.W.2d at 181 (Tex. 1981), on remand, 628 S.W.2d at 209. See
also Gaona v. Industrial Comm'n, 128 Ariz. 445, 626 P.2d 609 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (em-
ployee who lived on employer's premises for his own reasons, rather than the employer's con-
venience ineligible for workman's compensation benefits); Bourn v. James, 191 Neb. 635, 216
N.W.2d 739 (1974) (employee "on call" while living on employer's premises eligible).
31. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 24.00.
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ployee resulting in injury was compensable under the Act.32 This
approach is extended to those employees who elect to live on their
employer's property, as well as those ordered to live there, because the
same type of benefit-enhanced security-accrues to the employer re-
gardless of whether the employee's motivation for living on the prop-
erty is elective or mandated by the employment contract.
Several other decisions have involved unexplained deaths or inju-
ries suffered by employees when performing as watchmen or caretak-
ers when the deaths or injuries were apparently inflicted by assaultive
acts.33 In those cases, the Texas courts have followed a general course
of holding recovery proper if the assault was not demonstrated to
have been the result of personal animosity between the employee and
a third person, and the employer enjoyed some benefit from the em-
ployee's presence on the property.34 In United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. Whiting,35 for example, the employee died as a result
of an apparent accidental shooting by a sheriff's deputy who was in-
vestigating a report that shots had been fired on the property. 36 In
fact, the employee, who served as foreman on the property and took
telephone calls for his employer while residing on the property, col-
lected antique guns and his firing prompted the call to the sheriff's
department. 37 The employee was shot and killed while attempting to
investigate the intrusion upon the property committed by the deputy
who had entered the property to investigate the shots.38 The court
held that the employee's legal beneficiaries were entitled to recovery,
rejecting the argument that the deceased was killed as a result of per-
sonal malice between himself and the deputy who fired the fatal
32. 615 S.W.2d at 182 (see testimony of employer related in opinion.)
33. E.g., Elledge v. Great American Indem. Co., 159 Tex. 288, 320 S.W.2d 328 (1959)
(employee found dead on employer's premises after he had been hired by his employer to sleep
at plant); Vivier v. Lumberman's Indem. Exch., 250 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923,
judgmt adopted) (nightwatchman killed during a robbery); Southern Sur. v. Shook, 44 S.W.2d
425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ ref'd) (assault during a robbery). Compare West v.
Home Indem. Co., 444 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, no writ) (recovery for
watchman denied where injury inflicted while he attempted to prevent robbery at a filling
station and not on his employer's premises); Service Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 130 S.W.2d 392
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1939, writ dism'd) (recovery for watchman denied when assault
occurred on employer's premises but for reason not related to employment).
34. Id.
35. 597 S.W.2d 504, 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 506.
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shot.39
The Whiting decision demonstrates a significant problem in the
use of the accident/assault dichotomy when attempting to analyze in-
jury-producing events. Clearly, the shooting of the foreman was an
assaultive event. Yet, absent a clear demonstration of motive on the
part of the deputy, it is equally arguable that the shooting was acci-
dental'-because presumably the deputy would not have fired had he
known the shots were caused by someone having a right to be on the
property at the time. Characterization of the event-producing injury
as the result of personal malice is simply unsatisfactory in this sense
as a means of resolving difficult cases. In fact, the language of the
statutory exclusion for assault suggests an alternative characterization
which is discussed later in this article.
B. Special Cases-Injuries Sustained in Travel
A second major grouping of cases involves employees who sus-
tain unexplained injuries while traveling alone in the course of their
employment. The Freeman41 and Cuellar 2 decisions present this type
of situation, although Cuellar was the clearest from two distinct
standpoints. In Cuellar, the case involving the compensable bee sting,
the driver's regular activity in the course of his employment involved
driving trucks and his injury was not fatal, thus the trier of fact was
afforded the benefit of his testimony explaining the injury-producing
event.43 A more difficult set of facts confronted the court in Free-
man,44 in which the employee was killed in an automobile accident on
his way home from an employer-requested polygraph examination.
Freeman demonstrates the problems in determining whether the em-
ployee's death actually occurred within the course and scope of his
employment.
A decision rendered by the Tyler Court of Appeals in American
States Insurance Co. v. Caddell45 illustrates the types of problems
posed when the employee is deceased. The employee in Caddell used
a company pickup truck to travel from his home in Athens, Texas, to
39. Id. at 506-07.
40. Id. at 505.
41. 603 S.W.2d at 186. Supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
42. 468 S.W.2d at 880. Supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
43. 468 S.W.2d at 883.
44. 603 S.W.2d at 186.
45. 644 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
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Waco, Texas, in order to bid on a job for his employer.4 6 The evi-
dence showed chronologically that he had told his wife and secretary
he would be driving to Waco to bid on the job, that he had bought gas
in Waco, and that he died in a collision on a slick road which hap-
pened to be the direct route both from Waco and from his office to his
home." The court affirmed the jury verdict for the claimant, finding
that the "coming and going" exclusion did not apply to travel necessi-
tated by employment.48 The court discussed, but apparently dis-
missed, the argument that at the time of the employee's death he had
completed the task of work and was continuing home as he normally
would have done on an average work day.49 The broad language of
the Act's exception to the travel exclusion supports the court's rea-
soning;"0 yet the fact of the employee's death deprived the trier of fact
of the only conclusive evidence explaining the employee's actions on
the date of his death.
In both Freeman5 and Caddell,52 the reviewing courts found
support for jury verdicts favoring compensation in unexplained acci-
dent cases by looking to the circumstantial evidence establishing the
relationship between the accident and the employee's death. When
the result of the accident is death, the likelihood that the accident will
be unexplained increases substantially as does reliance on circumstan-
tial evidence to determine whether the logical inference to be drawn
from the facts supports a jury finding that the death occurred while
the employee was engaged in the activities of his employment.
III. ASSAULTS AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE INJURY TO
EMPLOYMENT
Injuries which result from assaultive acts rather than accidents
may also prove compensable in certain circumstances. Critical to this
determination is the relationship between the assault and the employ-
ment of the injured employee. An injury sustained while the em-
ployee is undeniably working on the job and for a reason clearly
connected to the employment provides the easiest case from which the
46. Id. at 886.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 887-88.
49. Id. at 886-87.
50. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § lb (Vernon 1967).
51. 603 S.W.2d at 192-93.
52. 644 S.W.2d at 886-88.
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determination can be made. 3 However, once other factors begin to
enter into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the injury-
producing assault, the determination becomes a more complex mat-
ter. The starting point for analysis of compensability for assaultive
injuries is "course and scope of employment."
A. Course and Scope of Employment
The claimant's burden in all workers' compensation actions is to
demonstrate that the injury was sustained while the employee was
acting within the course and scope of his employment. 4 A substan-
tial body of case law has been devoted to analysis of the parameters of
course and scope of employment. When the injury is sustained while
the employee is engaged in the normal performance of his duties, par-
ticularly at a well-defined workplace or job site, 5 this determination
leads to other considerations surrounding the assault which might ne-
gate coverage under the Act. Only when the duties, place, or time of
work are not so clearly defined does the issue of course and scope of
employment truly become a thorny matter of proof and statutory
construction.
For example, in B and B Nursing Home v. Blair,56 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court confronted a fairly uncommon set of facts which nev-
ertheless lead to a straight-forward conclusion on the issue of course
and scope. The claimant, an employee of the nursing home, was as-
saulted by an unknown assailant for no apparent motive while walk-
ing from the institution's main building to the laundry to attend to
53. For example, in Consolidated Underwriters v. Free, 253 S.W. 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Ft. Worth 1923, writ ref'd), a foreman was injured as a result of an assault committed upon
him while attempting to quell a riot on the employer's premises. See also Craig v. Electrolux
Corp., 212 Kan. 75, 510 P.2d 138 (1973) (robbery of employee whose duties included carrying
sums of money collected from employer's customers during employee's rounds held
compensable).
54. 615 S.W.2d at 181-82.
55. Consider the difficulties in assessing "workplace" in Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726,
735-36 (Wyo. 1980). In Beard, the Wyoming court distinguished between a compensable in-
jury suffered during work-related travel and the claimant's injury which occurred during travel
from her place of employment at the end of the workday. Even though claimant was compen-
sated for eleven hours of work for working a nine hour shift, the court rejected the argument
that her injury was work-related even though she was technically being compensated by the
employer at the time of her accident. The only benefit accruing to the employer during the
two additional compensated hours was that the "bonus" kept the employee interested in con-
tinuing the employment. No other benefit from the employer could be discerned justifying
compensation.
56. 496 P.2d 795 (Okla. 1972).
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her laundry duties." These duties were a part of her normal job.58
The court held that although the injury was inflicted by assault, the
employee had been engaged on the employer's premises in perform-
ance of her routine duties.59 Thus, the injury was compensable under
the Oklahoma statute. 6° Citing from an earlier opinion, the court
held:
An injury to a workman may be said to arise out of his employ-
ment, within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
when it is apparent, from a consideration of all the circumstances,
that a causal connection exists between the connection under
which the work is required to be performed and the resulting
61injury.
6
The Oklahoma Supreme Court also relied on the policy that the Act
be given a liberal construction, which it concluded, requires that a
reasonable doubt as to whether an injury arises out of employment be
resolved in favor of the employee.62
Even though the claimant's injury in Blair might not have actu-
ally arisen from the employment relationship, the court essentially in-
terpreted legislative policy in favor of compensation in that case. The
lack of evidence as to the motivating factor for the assault did not
deprive the employee of compensation, because of the clear relation-
ship between the fact of the assault and the employee's performance
of her usual duties at her usual place of employment.
The problem which often complicates the issue of the relation-
ship of the injury-producing event to the course and scope of employ-
ment involves situations in which the employee is injured away from
the normal workplace, in a workplace that is atypical, or during hours
which are only circumstantially tied to the performance of the em-
ployee's duties. To accommodate the issue raised when an employee
is not clearly working on the job when injured, nor in performance of
regular duties of the employment, the courts have fashioned doctrines
which view the course of employment liberally to tie the fact of em-
ployment to the injury-producing event. One doctrine frequently dis-
cussed and adopted by the courts is the "positional risk" or "but for"
57. Id. at 796.
58. Id. at 797.
59. Id.
60. 85 OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 1 (1970).
61. 496 P.2d at 798 (citing Mullins v. Tanksleary, 376 P.2d 590, 591 (Okla. 1962)).
62. 496 P.2d at 798.
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test.63
This concept, which has been relied on at least in principle in
Texas decisions,' is based on the notion that if the employee's injury
occurred because the employee was required to be in a specific place
at the time of the injury-producing event, the employee is entitled to
the benefits of the Act. For example, the employee may be entitled to
recovery because the duties of his employment exposed him to a situa-
tional risk not inherent in his work. The employee's recovery for a
bee sting in Cuellar is an example of this type of theory. 65 An other-
wise deliberate event might prove compensable when the employee's
duties required him to be exposed to the risk and to the ultimate in-
jury caused by the event. For instance, an employee may be entitled
to recovery when assaulted if the performance of his duties put the
employee in a position in which the risk of assault not inherent in the
employment was actualized.66
In Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. Marin,67 the female
employee of a service station working alone was raped and murdered
by a known assailant.68 While the risk of rape would not necessarily
arise from the nature of her employment, the court concluded that
but for the fact of her employment, the employee would not have been
exposed to the criminal conduct of her assailant at the time in ques-
tion.69 Similarly, a Wisconsin court, in Allied Manufacturing, Inc. v.
Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations,7° reviewed an ad-
ministrative award of compensation in a claim arising from the mur-
der of an employee based on the finding that the employer's action in
63. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 11.40.
64. See Cuellar, 644 S.W.2d at 887-88.
65. Id.
66. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 11.33. In Allen v. Dorothy's Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Co., 523 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975), the claimant, while delivering laundry,
was shot by a sniper who also killed two policemen during the shooting spree. The controlling
statute provided that "[tihe term "accident" as used in this section shall include, but not be
limited to, injury or death of the employee caused by the improvoked violence or assault
against the employee by any person." Id. at 876 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.120(1) (Supp.
1985)). A similar result not based on statutory authority as explicit as that adopted in Mis-
souri, was reached by a federal court applying Texas law in Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v.
Johnson, 148 F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 1945). Accord Hensley v. Glass, 226 Kan. 256, 597 P.2d
641 (1979).
67. 488 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
68. 488 S.W.2d at 869-70. See also Orr v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 335, 627
P.2d 1193 (1981) (similar result).
69. 448 S.W.2d at 871.
70. 45 Wis. 2d 563, 173 N.W.2d 690 (1970).
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isolating the employee at a remote location contributed to her mur-
der. The court adopted its version of the positional risk doctrine-
defining the employer's creation of a "zone of special danger"7 t-in
holding that the employee was entitled to recovery even if the reason
for the fatal assault was extraneous to her employment because the
fatal injuries had been inflicted and sustained in the work
environment.
Creation of a doctrine relating to the nexus between employment
and injury-producing event in specific circumstances constitutes a rec-
ognition that many cases cannot be easily or fairly resolved by looking
to the logical relationship of the type of injury-producing event and
the normal risks or hazards associated with employment. Thus, there
may be no statistical or logical relationship between an apparent mo-
tiveless assault and the performance of the employee's duties but the
absence of a logical connection between the two will not necessarily
defeat recovery if the exposure to the assault is occasioned by the em-
ployee's performance of his duties.
Another important consideration in the threshold analysis of
whether the injury occurred while the employee was performing the
duties of employment involves the statutory exclusion for injuries sus-
tained when the employee deviates from the duties of employment,
and that deviation contributes to an assault.72 The provocation of an
71. Id. at -, 173 N.W.2d at 692. The court, relying on Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 226 Wis. 81, 62 N.W.2d 567 (1954), also suggested that even if the motive for
claimant's murder had been demonstrated to be unrelated to her employment, recovery might
have been available if the work environment contributed to the circumstances of the assault.
45 Wis. 2d at -, 173 N.W.2d at 693.
72. See Erwin v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 63 S.W.2d 1076, 1077 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1933, writ ref'd). TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(4) (Vernon 1967), provides:
An injury caused by the employee's willful intention to injure himself, or to unlaw-
fully injure some other person, but shall include all other injuries of every kind and
character having to do with and originating in the work . . . of the employer re-
ceived by the employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or
business of his employer. ...
Id.
See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 11.15(d) (employee-aggressor situations). In Augustine v.
Washington Parish Policy Jury, 383 So.2d 1271 (La. Ct. App. 1980), recovery was denied
when the injured employee sustained injuries as a consequence of a calculated fight deliberately
staged with a fellow employee-both being armed-after work hours. Id. at 1277. Similarly, a
court denied compensation in Kurtz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 472 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1978, no writ), when the injury resulted from a fight among coemployees precipi-
tated by claimant agitating his assailant. See also Yelverton v. Kemp Furniture Co., 51 N.C.
App. 675, 277 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1981) (fight occurred when men were not performing work for
employer).
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assault for a reason not arising from the duties of the employment is
sufficient to negate recovery, even though the incident occurs at a
time and place consistent with the performance of the employee's du-
ties. 73 Resolution of difficult questions in this type of situation are
generally dependent upon the quality of explanation given by the ag-
gressor employee as to the motivating cause of the quarrel or dispute
and its relationship to employment.7 4  Here, as in all unexplained
cases, the death of the employee may result in a dearth of evidence
probative as to the actual motivation underlying the injury-producing
event.
B. Assaults Committed by Fellow Employees
A particular and significant class of cases involves injuries sus-
tained by an employee due to an altercation with fellow employees.
Logically, the connection between the parties and the location of the
assault is the jobsite, which suggests that compensation would be
available for this type of injury-producing event. The Act, however,
excludes coverage when the reasons for the assault do not arise from
the nature of the employment itself.75 Texas cases have not drawn
clear lines in defining the types of motivation for the assault which
will justify an award of compensation.
The clearest cases are those in which the assault is predicated on
some conflict among employees as to the manner in which the duties
of employment are to be performed. In Commercial Standard Insur-
ance Co. v. Austin,76 for instance, two employees argued on the job
over the manner in which the claimant was to perform his duties.
The other employee was discharged, left the jobsite, then returned an
73. For example, an Indiana court denied recovery in Lincoln v. Whirlpool Corp., 151
Ind. App. 190, 279 N.E.2d 596 (1972), when the employee's horseplay at work escalated into
his fatal shooting by a nonemployee juvenile. The court held that the injury did not arise out
of employment and was consequently not compensable. 151 Ind. App. at 297 N.E.2d at 601.
Id. at 601. In contrast, an Arizona court held that when the injuries arise from employment, it
is immaterial under ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-943 (F) (1983) whether the injured em-
ployee was the aggressor. Colvert v. Industrial Comm'n, 21 Ariz. App. 409, 520 P.2d 322
(1974). See also Martinez v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 127 Cal. Rptr. 150, 15 Cal.
3d 982, 544 P.2d 1350 (1976) (construing California's statutory exclusion for injuries sustained
by aggressor-employees in assault cases. See CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600(g) (West 1971).
74. Thus, if the employee sustains injuries in an effort to protect his employer's property,
the injury may be compensable even if he is the technical aggressor in the situation.
75. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(4) (Vernon 1967) (definition of injury
sustained). See supra note 72.
76. 128 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.).
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hour later and killed the claimant.77 The plaintiff presented sufficient
evidence of a connection between the employment and the assault to
justify an award of death benefits.7" Austin was followed and ex-
panded in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Bradley,79 a case in which the
claimant, employed as a hotel desk clerk, argued with the relief clerk
over whether the claimant had called him at the proper time to take
over at the desk."° The dispute resulted in the relief clerk assaulting
the claimant whose claim was viewed favorably by the reviewing
court because it did in fact arise from "the manner in which the work
was being done."'8
Bradley relied on McClure v. Georgia Casualty Co.,82 as well as
Austin, in reaching its conclusion.8 3 McClure, however, has been
called into question by other courts.8 4 In McClure, the Commission
of Appeals concluded that an injury inflicted by a fellow employee
may be compensable even though the motivation for the assault may
have been the other employee's malice or deliberate intention to in-
jure." In Bradley, the commission reasoned that a connection existed
between employment and the injury because the claimant's employ-
ment exposed him to both the fellow employee and to the risk of as-
sault at the hands of the fellow employee.8 6 In Texas Indemnity
Insurance Co. v. Cheely87, the Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected the
reasoning advanced in McClure, holding that the claimant's burden
was to show more than that his fellow employee was assaulted while
on the job or while engaged in his employer's business or affairs.88
Instead, the court of appeals held that the claimant must demonstrate
that the assaultive injury was "of such kind and character as had to
do with and originated in the employer's work, trade, business, or
77. Id. at 837.
78. Id. See also Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n. v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (employee injured in scuffle with foreman whose testimony
showed scuffle based on dispute over employee's performance of work entitled to recovery).
79. 415 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, no writ).
80. Id. at 929.
81. Id. at 934.
82. 251 S.W. 800 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, opinion adopted).
83. 415 S.W.2d at 933.
84. E.g., Texas Indem. Ins. Co. v. Cheely, 232 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1950, writ refd) (rejected McClure, holding that the claimant's burden was to show
more than that his fellow employee was assaulted while on the job).
85. 251 S.W.2d at 804.
86. 415 S.W.2d at 933-34 (quoting McClure, 251 S.W.2d at 803).
87. 232 S.W.2d at 124.
88. Id. at 126.
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profession."8 9
In a more recent decision, United Pacific Insurance Co. v. Far-
ley, 90 the Waco Court of Appeals considered an employee's claim for
injuries resulting from a fellow employee's assault upon him. The
claimant had hired the other worker and paid him personally for
work done on behalf of the employer company.9' The claimant was
assaulted over a dispute concerning his refusal to pay the other em-
ployee for wages claimed. 92 The appellate court looked to the fact
that the motivation for the assault was clearly traceable to a matter
arising from employment, particularly since it concerned a pay dis-
pute, and also to the fact that the assault was the product of an argu-
ment which took place while the claimant was on the job.93
Additionally, Farley noted the lack of any evidence that there had
been a "personal grudge that preexisted" between the two employ-
ees. 94 The court also suggested a more restrictive approach than the
one adopted in the commission's opinion in McClure by observing:
The mere fact that two employees of the same employer, or one of
them and a third person not employed by the same employer, en-
gage in a fight, is not controlling of the question of whether or not
one of the employees who receives an injury while engaged in it is
entitled to compensation. 95
While more restrictive in its approach than McClure, Farley appears
to suggest that an assault committed by a fellow employee is more
likely to arise from the employment relationship than one committed
by a third person. Absent a showing of antecedent malice on the part
of the fellow employee, or of a motive clearly unrelated to employ-
ment, it is arguable that an unexpressed presumption favors such
claims simply because no other apparent motivation which would ex-
clude coverage exists. Similarly, the strong case would almost always
involve an assault committed on the job site, or an assault following
an argument which took place on the job site during the normal hours
of employment.96
89. Id.
90. 566 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
91. Id. at 679.
92. Id. at 680.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 681.
95. Id.
96. Mayo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161, 457 P.2d 400 (1969). (Death of a store
manager while at work caused by violent assault committed by an assistant manager held
compensable when no prior difficulties between the two were demonstrated). See also Van
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C. Assaults Apparently Committed by Third Persons
Under the Texas Act, injuries sustained as a result of an assault
committed upon the employee are compensable,97 unless the assault is
committed by a third person for a reason unrelated to the employ-
ment relationship.98 This rule is not entirely comprehensive because
of problems inherent in determining whether the motivation for the
assault justifies exclusion from coverage under the statutory language.
The determination is also complicated by the fact that in a significant
number of cases, the assaulted employee has died from his wounds, or
as in the Blair case,99 remains alive, but is simply unable to identify
the assailant or to provide any insight into the motivation for the
assault.
Analysis of the issues in third party assault cases is often ren-
dered more difficult by the lack of sufficient facts from which the criti-
cal questions can be answered. Therefore, it is desirable to categorize
typical fact situations as starting points for analysis.
1. Assaults "Obviously" Directed at Employees Because of Their
Employment
The easiest questions arise in those cases in which all parties gen-
erally agree that the facts support the inference of employment-moti-
vated assault by the third person. For instance, robberies in which
the injured employee victim is the person charged with responsibility
for the enterprise's funds and those funds are taken by force provide
the typical case in which recovery is virtually assured."°° Even
Duzee v. Industrial Comm'n, 25 Ariz. App. 395, 543 P.2d 1152 (1975) (injuries sustained by
employee attempting to break up fight among co-workers during work hours compensable);
Alpine Roofing Co. v. Dalton, 36 Colo. App. 315, 539 P.2d 487 (1975) (employee assaulted by
foreman upon discharge could recover even though employee called foreman a vulgar name,
apparently precipitating assault). Accord Brannum v. Spring Lakes Country Club, Inc., 203
Kan. 658, 455 P.2d 546 (1969) (assaulting employee disgruntled over work assignments).
97. Marin, 488 S.W.2d at 869 ("an assault arises out of the employment if the risk of
assault is increased because of the nature of the work, or if the reason for the assault is a
quarrel having its origin in the work").
98. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
99. 496 P.2d 795 (Okla. 1972).
100. Vivier, 250 S.W. at 417 (nightwatchman's death compensable when assailant's motive
was robbery); Texas Employer's Ins. Assoc. v. Lawrence, 14 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1929, writ ref'd) (death of employee from gas explosion occurring in tent which em-
ployee was required to occupy in camp controlled by employer held compensable). See also
Workman's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. DelCimmuto, 23 Pa. Commw. 43, 350 A.2d 459
(1976) (uniformed security guard fatally shot in store parking lot, held compensable). Cf
West v. Home Indem. Co., 444 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, no writ),
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though the assailant's motivation may have in fact involved the par-
ticular employee robbed and assaulted, the fact that the robbery in-
volves both the employee personally and the performance of his duties
for his employer serves to negate operation of the statutory exclu-
sion. O' Arguably, even if the evidence disclosed a motive personal to
both the employee and his assailant, the nexus between the assaultive
act and the employee's ostensible performance of duties in behalf of
the employer would justify compensation for the injury sustained.
This approach is suggested by the factual context of the Marin case1"2
in which the deceased female service station attendant was robbed,
raped, and killed at her place of employment. The evidence suggested
some prior relationship between the employee and her assailant which
might have supported the conclusion that her rape was the result of a
personal, rather than employment related, motivation on the part of
the assailant."10 However, the proof of this suggested prior relation-
ship was simply inadequate. Even though the assailant confessed to
the crime, the confession itself was not specific as to motivation or
prior relationship. Moreover, the court strained to find that the em-
ployment duties of the deceased employee necessarily exposed her to
the fatal attack;" a theory which would not justify an award of bene-
fits in a case in which the prior relationship, personal animus, or spe-
cific motive was more clearly demonstrated by the evidence.
A clearer situation is illustrated by Vivier v. Texas Lumberman's
Indemnity Exchange, ° another nightwatchman case. There an em-
ployee was assaulted during his hours of employment by assailants in
the process of committing a burglary on the employer's premises.1
0 6
A sadistic murder committed upon an employee during the course of
a robbery was similarly compensable in Southern Surety v. Shook."°7
The Eastland Court of Appeals concluded in Shook, that the assailant
entered upon the property for the purpose of committing robbery,
(nightwatchman shot while trying to prevent robbery at filling station while there to buy ciga-
rettes and drink and not at premises he was employed to guard did not sustain compensable
injury).
101. Shook, 44 S.W.2d at 425 (joint motive of assailant robbery and sadistic assault).
102. 488 S.W.2d at 863, 869-70.
103. Id. at 863. See also Employers Ins. Co. v. Wright, 108 Ga. App. 380, 133 S.E.2d 39
(1963) (female employee of laundry pick-up station raped on premises by assailant pretending
to be customer held compensable).
104. 488 S.W.2d at 869-70.
105. 250 S.W. 417 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, judgmt adopted).
106. Id. at 417-18.
107. 44 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ ref'd).
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thereby supplying a causal connection between the murder and the
scope of the employee's normal activity at work. 08 The deceased em-
ployee in Shook was employed in a quasi-watchman capacity as an oil
field pumper and was required to live on the property where the well
was located.1o9 Even though he was actually assaulted while hunting
on adjacent land, the court concluded that he was essentially on duty
during the entire time he was on the property or within hearing dis-
tance of the pump." 10 Since a critical duty of his employment was to
attend to the well when the engine ceased functioning, the court inter-
preted his duties to include any activity performed while the employee
listened for breakdowns in the pumping operation."' The nature of
the employment itself may have suggested a greater connection be-
tween assaultive injuries and employment than might otherwise be
suspected. If the employee is injured in the performance of customary
work activities, any act directed at the employer by a third person
which results in injury to the employee may prove compensable based
upon a liberal interpretation of the employee's duties.
2. Assaults "Obviously" Directed at the Employee For Reasons
Extraneous to Employment
In terms of proof, a more difficult set of cases arise from assaults
motivated by reasons clearly unrelated to the employee's employ-
ment. These cases often involve assaults committed upon the em-
ployee at the workplace or during the performance of the employee's
duties, circumstances which at least implicate the employment rela-
tionship as a factor in the assault. Texas courts have looked to evi-
dence of antecedent malice existing between the employee and the
assailant as a factor demonstrating that the employment was not the
motivation for the assault. 1 2 Typically, Texas cases have involved
assaults committed on the job, but growing out of domestic disputes.
For example, in Liberty Mutual'Insurance Co. v. Upton," 3 the em-
ployee was killed by her husband while at work and while engaged in
the normal activities of her employment. The evidence demonstrated
108. Id. at 426-27.
109. Id. at 425. See also Lawrence, 14 S.W.2d at 951 (employee killed by gas explosion
and fire while asleep on employer's property in quarters provided by employer was entitled to
compensation).
110. Id. at 427.
111. Id. at 427-28.
112. See Vivier, 250 S.W. at 418.
113. 492 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, no writ).
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that the killing resulted from a domestic quarrel between the couple,
thus recovery was precluded by the statutory exclusion.114 Similarly,
the black-jack beating of the employee in Fidelity and Casualty Co. v.
Cogdill, 1 5 was not compensable because circumstantial evidence
showed the attack on the employee, a movie projectionist, was
prompted by the assailant's suspicion that the employee was involved
in an extra-marital affair with the assailant's wife.116
Evidence of antecedent malice, or a cause for the assault predat-
ing or extraneous to the employee's employment, is also sufficient to
overcome the expressed preference for recovery in the caretaker situa-
tion. In Service Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vaughn," 7 the employee was
a nightwatchman hired to guard his employer's machinery. His
daughter and her husband had separated, precipitating threats against
the employee from the estranged son-in-law. 118 Hopkins, the son-in-
law, killed Vaughn by striking him with a hammer while the latter
was guarding the machinery, as per his employment contract." 9 The
court concluded the evidence showed antecedent malice between the
assailant and his victim which excluded coverage under the Act even
though the injury occurred while the employee was performing the
duties of his employment.'2
In those cases in which the insurer can show that the assault was
clearly motivated for reasons unrelated to the employee's employ-
ment, recovery would appear precluded under the statute unless the
claimant can suggest a dual motivation necessarily involving the em-
ployment as a factor. Thus, even if the assailant initially intends to
assault the employee finding the latter at work, the injury may still be
compensable if a secondary motive, such as robbery of the employer
or his business, is also established by the evidence and the evidence
presents a strong enough correlation between the assailant's motiva-
tion and the injury actually sustained. In any event, when the evi-
dence shows the possibility that both motivations prompted the
assault, the question should be resolved in favor of recovery since the
assault cannot be shown to be wholly unrelated to employment. 12 1
114. Id. at 626.
115. 164 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd).
116. Id. at 218.
117. 130 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1939, writ dism'd judgmt cor.).
118. Id. at 393.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 394-95.
121. By analogy, consider the dual purpose doctrine which permits recovery for an injury
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3. Unexplained Assaults
Unexplained assaults resulting in injury or death to employees
pose the most interesting problems in interpreting and applying the
statutory exclusion from coverage. The assault may be unexplained
for different reasons. Typically, the assault is unexplained because the
identity of the assailant is unknown and the circumstances ambigu-
ous, 1 2 2 or because the motivation or prior relationship between a
known assailant and employee are undetermined. 123 Not atypically,
the circumstances of the injury-producing event may be sufficiently
ambiguous so that the source of injury may itself be imprecisely cate-
gorized.1 24 For instance, in Deatherage the immediate cause of the
employee's death clearly was attributable to fire since his remains
were discovered among the debris of the burned-out trailer in which
he lived while on his employer's property.1 25 The evidence suggested
the possibility of a brush fire in the area on a date close in time to the
employee's date of death, but its origin or connection with the fire at
the trailer were not demonstrated. 126  It is conceivable that the fire
that produced the claimant's deceased's death was accidental in ori-
gin, or was the product of arson-in which case the facts would have
suggested an issue relating to assaultive act committed by a third per-
son. 127  Difficulty in characterizating injury-producing events may
sustained during employment-related travel, even though the employee is also engaged in his
personal affairs during the trip. See Marks' Dependents v. Gray, 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181
(1929); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3809, § 16 (Vernon 1967) (codifying the dual purpose
doctrine in cases in which the trip would not have been made but for the employment purpose
and the injury would not otherwise have been sustained). See also Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd. v. Plum, 20 Pa. Commw. 35, 340 A.2d 637, 640 (1975) ("inconsequential or inno-
cent departures from course of employment will not bar compensation").
122. Eg., Walters, 654 S.W.2d at 425 (identity of assailant unknown); Blair, 496 P.2d at
796 (identity of assailant unknown).
123. Marin, 488 S.W.2d at 863 (evidence that assailant confessed, claiming he and em-
ployee had prior relationship, including consensual sexual relations and that cause of murder
was her rejection of his offer of marriage, not dispositive of issue of assailant's motivation:
.. it is clear that the jury refused to accept this version of the killing").
124. Proof of the cause of fatal injury itself may pose problems for trial counsel, particu-
larly in cases in which so-called "natural causes" are indefinite in origin, such as heart attacks.
See Rogers v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 289 Or. 633, 616 P.2d 485 (1980). See generally
Sullivan, When Death is the Issue: Uses of Pathological Testimony and Autopsy Reports at
Trial, 19 WILLAMETrE L.J. 579 (1983) (suggesting uses of expert testimony and autopsy re-
ports as means of examining alternative theories of causation of death).
125. 628 S.W.2d at 211.
126. Id. at 212.
127. Arson is an intentional criminal act, as defined by TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02
(Vernon Supp. 1984).
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well invade analysis of the apparent unexplained assault in a case like
this and speculation as to causation might provide the parties with
interesting routes of investigation. However, in the absence of proof
of an apparent assault such as wounds on the body of the injured or
deceased employee which in all medical probability were produced by
the acts of another person,' 28 reliance on the third party theory of
exclusion is simply not feasible. When the evidence clearly indicates
an assaultive act of some type, the threshold factor involved in analyz-
ing the case in terms of the statutory exclusion is reached.
The identity of the assailant is not a critical factor in those cases
in which the evidence suggests a theory of the assault directly related
to employment. Thus, an assault may be unexplained in the sense
that the identity of the assailant is unknown, yet is essentially ex-
plained if it occurs during the commission of a robbery of the em-
ployer. 129 The closer question is presented when the assaultive act
was directed exclusively at the employee. For instance, in the Blair
case,"'3 the Oklahoma court specifically noted the absence of any evi-
dence that the employee had been robbed, thereby suggesting that the
reason for the assault was personal to the assailant, the employee, or
both of them' might have been established. Similarly, an assault
which occurs while the employee is either going to or leaving work is
less likely to result in compensation given the combined effect of the
travel exception and the decreased likelihood that the employment
relationship motivated the attack.
The Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals in Wall v. Royal Indem-
nity Co.,132 relied on the force of this combination of exceptions to
justify exclusion based on the murder of an employee by assailants
lying in wait for him while on his way home from work. Specula-
tively, of course, an employment-based motivation for the assault can
not be ruled out in this type of case, particularly when the identity of
the assailant is unknown. In theory and in fact, the assailant could
well be a fellow employee or a third person whose quarrel with the
128. See Sullivan, supra note 124, at 602-06.
129. Matin, 488 S.W.2d at 865 ("the intentional killing of an on-duty employee, for the
purpose of robbing him, is an injury sustained in the course of employment").
130. 496 P.2d at 796 ("She was neither sexually assaulted nor robbed"). But see Fiorello,
280 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (robbery of employee's wallet and ring and assault occurred at employer's
parking lot while victim was on way to job deemed compensable under New York statute).
131. The inference that a personally motivated assault would not also result in robbery
would seem speculative, at best.
132. 299 S.W. 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1927, no writ).
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employee arose from the nature of the latter's duties of employ-
ment. 133 Absent claimant's ability to show this type of connection,
however, the combined effect of the two theories of exclusion would
appear virtually impossible to overcome. It is reasonable to assume
that some claimants entitled to compensation under the Act will be
denied benefits because the circumstances do not suggest a strong
enough relationship to the employment to justify compensation and
because the evidence necessary to make the connection is simply
unavailable.' 34
The converse situation is always potentially present in the unex-
plained assault case. An apparent motive linked to employment may,
in fact, cover a personal motive known only to the assailant and the
employee/victim. Existence of antecedent malice which would satisfy
the statutory requirement for exclusion may remain undisclosed to
the parties, resulting in compensation for some claimants who would
not be entitled if all of the facts were presented to the court.
For example, the facts in Walters v. American States Insurance
Co. 135 are illustrative of the type of problem encountered in an unex-
plained death case. The evidence adduced at trial showed that at least
twice in the week preceding his murder, Richard Lamport, the claim-
ant's employer, received business calls concerning the possibility of
him making a business presentation on a Saturday morning in
1978.136 The evening before the presentation Lamport called his em-
ployee, Ivan Justice, and directed him to pick up a portfolio com-
monly used in the company's business presentations at their office.' 1
3 7
Lamport also asked Justice to stop by the Lamport residence to dis-
cuss the next morning's presentation. 138 According to the testimony
of Lamport's girlfriend, they discussed the presentation at their Fri-
day evening meeting. 139 She also testified that next to the phone in
the townhouse they shared she found a note in Lamport's handwrit-
133. Consider Justice Cadena's analysis of Wall, in Marin, 488 S.W.2d at 866-67, discuss-
ing the doctrine of antecedent malice and counsel's apparent pleading error in bringing the
assault within the statutory exclusion by claiming that the deceased's assailants deliberately
sought him out.
134. The best examples are demonstrated by the facts in the appellate court opinions of
Walters, 654 S.W.2d at 424-25 and Deatherage, 628 S.W.2d at 209.
135. 654 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. 1983).
136. Id. at 426-27.
137. Id. at 427.
138. Id.
139. 636 S.W.2d 794, 795 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982).
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ing containing a reference to "Marina Hotel, 11:00." ' 40 The next
morning Justice drove by Lamport's residence and they left to-
gether.14' Their bodies were discovered a few hours later lying in a
field off a road located somewhere between the Lamport residence and
the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport-the location of Airport
Marina Hotel. 42 Both men had been shot in the back, fatally, and
Justice's body contained three gunshot wounds, apparently inflicted
from a distance.
4 3
Justice's ex-wife sued for workers' compensation benefits on be-
half of their minor son, 44 pleading that Justice was killed while in the
course and scope of his employment under the theory that his em-
ployer, Lamport, had directed him to accompany him to the business
meeting on the date of their deaths.1 4' The insurer defended on the
ground that the employee was not engaged in the course and scope of
his employment at the time of his death."4
At trial the insurer argued that since Justice was killed by the
obvious act of a third party, the statutory exclusion came into play
and recovery should be denied. 47 The jury returned a unanimous
verdict, however, finding that Justice was killed while in the course
and scope of employment.1
41
On appeal, the Tyler Court of Appeals reversed, 4 9 adopting the
position advanced by the insurer in its no evidence point. 5 ° The
court of appeals held that because the claimant had failed to show
that the assaultive act of the deceased employee's killer was motivated
by some aspect of the employee's employment relationship, there was
no evidence to prove that he was killed in the course and scope of his
employment.' 5' The Texas Supreme Court did not reach the issue
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. 654 S.W.2d at 427.
143. Id.
144. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
145. 654 S.W.2d at 424.
146. Id. at 425. The insurer did not allege any specific facts showing that the employee




149. 636 S.W.2d at 794.
150. See Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEX. L.
REV. 361, 362 (1960). See TEX. R. Civ. P. 301, 418.
151. 636 S.W.2d at 796-97.
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relating to the allocation of the burden of proving the motivation for
the assault. Instead, it held that claimant had met her burden of
presenting some evidence to show that the assault was related to em-
ployment and reversed the lower court's decision on the "no evi-
dence" point. 152
Walters'53 raises a number of possibilities in terms of the unex-
plained nature of the assault causing the employee's death. For exam-
ple, the identity of the assailant was never discovered by the parties or
law enforcement agencies investigating the apparent murder.
15 4
While murder was the apparent cause of death in terms of application
of the theory of criminal law to the facts, the evidence did not conclu-
sively rule out the possibility of bizarre accident. Further, the homi-
cide did not occur at the workplace or during the normal hours of
business on the day of claimant's death.155 No evidence of robbery or
an independent motive toward the employee was demonstrated or
suggested by the facts. 156 The insurer's position was based upon the
autopsy report of the cause of death as homicide, 57 a medico-legal
determination from which the insurer extrapolated that the legal con-
clusion of murder was applicable. 5 ' Flowing from the theory that
the employee's death was the result of murder, the insurer argued
consistently that in the case of a murder committed by an unknown
assailant, the claimant has the burden of demonstrating that the mur-
der was precipitated by the employment relationship in order to jus-
tify an award of death benefits under the Act. 159
IV. PROBLEMS POSED BY UNEXPLAINED ASSAULTS
Even when the injury-producing event is properly characterized
152. 654 S.W.2d at 424. The majority in Walters narrowed the scope of its review to the
issues expressly preserved for review which involved the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the jury's answer to the issue submitted to the jury at trial.
153. 654 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1983).
154. Id. at 427.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 426-27.
157. 636 S.W.2d at 795. See Sullivan, supra note 124, at 595 n.60, 596-97 n.63 (example
B).
158. The court of appeals adopted the insurer's position: "If there is one thing certain in
this case, Justice's death was not an accident." 636 S.W.2d at 797. On appeal to the Texas
Supreme Court, Justice McGee in his concurring opinion, drew a similar conclusion: "[o]nce
it was established that Justice's death was the result of a homicide-an intentional injury in-
flicted by a third person-American States discharged its burden." 654 S.W.2d at 429.
159. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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as an assault, as opposed to an accident, the problem of determining
whether the injury is compensable is not fully solved. In fact, given
the language of the statutory exclusion," the problem is simply
posed for the parties and the jury. The essential question in terms of
the matters of proof is motivation for the assault and the perspective
from which motivation must be assessed. The latter requires defini-
tive statutory construction by the Texas Supreme Court which was
not provided by its opinion in Walters. 161 The key issue lies in distin-
guishing between a motivation for the assault when viewed solely
from the perspective of the assailant1 62 and when viewed from the
perspective of the injured employee.' 63
If motivation is to be considered by reference to the assailant's
actual motivation, significant problems of proof are presented for
claimants in unexplained assault cases, particularly when the assault
has resulted in the employee's death at the hands of his assailant. On
the other hand, if the issue of an employment related motive for the
assault is viewed from the perspective of the employee, the potential
for denial of benefits is reduced by excluding those cases in which no
pre-existing relationship between the employee and the assailant can
be demonstrated.164 Thus, if the focal point for the court's considera-
160. Id.
161. The majority opinion of the supreme court in Walters, 654 S.W.2d at 423, does not
specifically address the issue. But Justice McGee, in his concurring opinion points out:
"[tihus, in any case involving an intentional assault upon the employee, the claimant must
persuade the trier of fact that the attack was not motivated by reasons personal to the em-
ployee, but was directed against him because of his employment." Id. at 429. (citing High-
lands Underwriters Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 485 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, no
writ)).
162. In contrast to Justice McGee's characterization of the court's opinion, the Highlands
court noted that the determination focuses on "reasons personal to the assailant and the one
assaulted." 485 S.W.2d at 595. A Pennsylvania court in Cleland Simpson Co. v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Bd., 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 566, 332 A.2d 862 (1975), construed the rele-
vant statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85), to focus on motivation for
the assault personal to the assailant, rather than to the employee. But see California Compen-
sation & Fire Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 65 Cal. 2d 155, 436 P.2d 67, 65
Cal. Rptr. 155 (1968) (no reason to deny compensation to employee whose duties exposed her
to peculiar risk of assault merely because assailant motivated by personal reasons).
163. The comment to 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC
21.20 (1970) explains that "[t]he statute uses the phrase 'because of reasons personal to him.'
This has been interpreted by the courts to mean 'because of reasons personal to the employee,'
as shown in the instruction." (citing Vivier v. Lumbermen's Indem. Exch., 250 S.W. 417 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1923, judgmt adopted); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 222 S.W.2d 907,
914-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 227 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.
1950)).
164. See, e.g., Highlands, 485 S.W.2d at 596 (evidence failed to show a prior motivation of
1985] UNEXPLAINED ACCIDENTS 903
tion is truly antecedent malice, as suggested by a number of the
cases, 6' the proper perspective for resolution of the threshold issue
necessarily requires consideration of the motive as a matter personal
to the employee, and not the assailant. For instance, if the assailant's
motivation is rape without regard to the identity of the victim, that
motivation would not preclude recovery even though it might bear no
causal relationship to the fact of the victim's employment, other than
being committed while the victim was performing in normal duties of
employment.166 If the motivation is to be judged from the perspective
of the assailant and the rape merely evidences a general criminal in-
tention, recovery might be precluded on the theory that rape is not a
risk unique or inherent to the nature of the victim's employment.
67
The comment to the appropriate section of Texas Pattern Jury
Charges suggests that the proper consideration is whether the motiva-
tion for the assault can be characterized as personal to the employee,
and not to the assailant. 6  The pattern instruction provides that
"[a]n injury is not in the course of employment if it is caused by the
act of another person intended to injure the employee because of rea-
sons personal to the employee and not directed against him as an em-
the assailant unrelated to employment). See also Mayo v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 93 Idaho 161,
457 P.2d 400 (1969) (evidence failed to show either occupational or personal motive for
assault).
165. See, e.g., Cogdill, 164 S.W.2d at 217 (recovery denied due to assailant's suspicion that
employee engaged in extramarital affair with assailant's wife); Vaughn, 130 S.W.2d at 392
(denial of recovery based on prior threats against employee by estranged son-in-law).
166. Matin, 488 S.W.2d at 869-70.
167. Id. Compare Marin with the cases in which the assault is apparently motivated by the
employee's affair, or suspected affair, with the spouse of the assailant and recovery is pre-
cluded. See, e.g., Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350 (1972) (evidence indi-
cated murders committed because husband believed employee had replaced him in his wife's
affection); Gutierrez v. Artesia Pub. Schools, 92 N.M. 109, 583 P.2d 476 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978)
(no recovery because murder motivated by assailant's knowledge that his wife and victim had
engaged in sexual intercourse); Freeman v. Callow, 525 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. App. 1975) (no
recovery because assault motivated by private quarrel over employee's claimed interest in cus-
tomer's wife); Ellis v. Rose Oil Co., 190 So.2d 450 (Miss. 1966) (no recovery because shooting
motivated by employee was having an affair with third party's wife).
Other cases have held injuries sustained while at work, but resulting from similar motiva-
tion, compensable. See, e.g., Ross v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. App. 3d
949, 99 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1971) (recovery allowed for employee shot by customer's jealous hus-
band because employee allegedly had an "affair" with customer); Goings v. Edwards, 222
So.2d 530 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (recovery allowed where employee assaulted while walking in
company-owned parking and roadway); Powell v. Gold Crown Stamp Co., 204 So.2d 61 (La.
Ct. App. 1967) (recovery allowed when husband accused employee of kissing his employee-
wife and then fatally shot her).
168. See supra note 163.
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ployee or because of his employment."' 6 9 The pattern instruction
defines the rather vague statutory reference to "him" in the language
of the exclusion by directly stating that the personal nature of the
motivation must be personal to the employee. 7 ° The comment relies
on cases construing the statutory reference to "him" to specifically
refer to the employee, rather than the assailant, in making this
determination. '7'
Assuming the determination is to be made based on the evidence
of a motivation personal to the employee, some fact patterns suggest
difficulty even with this starting point. For example, in Velasquez v.
Industrial Commission,171 a Colorado court held that employees shot
by a co-employee while at work and on the employer's premises were
not entitled to benefits under the statute because the assailant's moti-
vation was his belief that the other employees had been making ob-
scene telephone calls to his wife. ' 71 The court ruled that the
employees injured in the shooting had failed to show that the shooting
could not have happened at some other time or place and thus, that
the injuries would not have occurred but for the fact of their employ-
ment."' The troubling aspect of this opinion is that it suggests that
the assailant's motive, being directed at his co-employees specifically,
should dominate the analysis of the work-related aspect of the issue.
At first blush, the Colorado court's approach would appear con-
sistent with Upton ' and other cases in which personal disputes have
spilled over into employment, suggesting the possibility of an employ-
ment related injury. 176 Were this clearly the case, the court's ap-
proach was probably correct, applying the same skepticism toward
co-worker assaults as that suggested by Farley177 in holding that the
mere fact that a co-worker commits the assault is not sufficient to
demonstrate a compensable injury under the Texas Act.17 8 However,
169. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 21.20 (1970).
170. Id.
171. See supra note 163.
172. 41 Colo. App. 201, 581 P.2d 748 (1978).
173. 41 Colo. App.-, 581 P.2d at 748.
174. 41 Colo. App. -, 581 P.2d at 748.
175. 492 S.W.2d at 623.
176. E.g., Epperson v. Industrial Comm'n, 26 Ariz. App. 467, 549 P.2d 247 (1976) (do-
mestic dispute between husband and employee wife finally resulting in assaultive injury while
employee was at work not compensable since cause did not arise out of the duties of
employment).
177. 566 S.W.2d at 677.
178. Id. at 681.
904 [Vol. 16:875
UNEXPLAINED ACCIDENTS
if the injured employees in Velasquez 7 9 were not aware of their co-
worker's suspicion, then the Colorado court seems to have unfairly
inferred existence of antecedent malice which would have justified its
decision. 8 The interpretation may have been correct under the Col-
orado statute,1 8' and if so, suggests a different posture than that recog-
nized by the Comment to Texas Pattern Jury Charges' 82 which relies
solely on the assailant's motivation as determinative of the relation-
ship between the assault and the victimized worker's employment.
The implication of Velasquez for Texas cases is clear: if the moti-
vation must be personal to the employee for the insurer to successfully
defend on the basis of the exclusion, can the insurer assert a motiva-
tion of the assailant directed toward the employee for a nonemploy-
ment related reason with success even though the injured employee is
unaware of the assailant's motive? Typically, a successful defense
based on this theory has been predicated on facts in which antecedent
malice or a nonemployment motive involves both the employee and
his assailant actively in the proof so that there is no real issue con-
cerning the employee's possible understanding of the motivation of his
assailant. For example, in Gutierrez v. Artesia Public Schools,1 83 the
victim of a murder had been having an affair with his assailant's wife.
The assailant apparently acted out of his knowledge of the affair, kill-
ing the employee while he was at school, but not while he was teach-
ing. 184 The fact that the employee was killed as a result of a wilful or
criminal assault not arising from employment provided the basis for
the court's conclusion that the deceased employee's beneficiaries were
not entitled to compensation.' 85 The case also typifies the usual situa-
tion in which the employee is aware of the reason for the assault by
virtue of his participation in some activity giving rise to the assailant's
motivation. The difficulties posed by focusing on the assailant's moti-
vation rather than the employee's involvement, knowledge, or under-
standing of the factor giving rise to the assault become clearer when
179. 141 Colo. App. at 201, 581 P.2d at 748.
180. But see Siebert v. Hoch, 199 Kan. 299, 428 P.2d 825 (1967), in which the Kansas
Supreme Court suggested that even assaults for private reasons might be compensable if the
fact of employment facilitated the assault and, thus, the injured employee's employment be-
comes a contributing factor to the assault.
181. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-52-102 (1984 Supp.).
182. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES PJC 21.10 (1970).
183. 92 N.M. 112, 583 P.2d 476 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
184. 92 N.M. at -, 583 P.2d at 477.
185. Id. (relying on N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-13.3 (1953)).
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viewed in light of peculiar problems associated with unexplained as-
sault cases.
A. Proof of Identity of the Assailant
A critical problem in focusing on the assailant's motivation as
the key factor in determining compensability in third party assault
cases, arises when the identity of the assailant is simply not known to
the injured employee. The problem is particularly acute in the unex-
plained case when the employee has been killed by the attacker and
no other witnesses to the conduct causing the death are available. In
this case, the trier of fact is deprived of even the testimony of the
assaulted employee who might testify concerning the identity or lack
of previous relationship with the assailant. The identity of the assail-
ant in Walters v. American States Insurance Company,"' for example,
was not known to the parties prior to trial, at least in part because law
enforcement officials had not solved the apparent criminal homicide
or even focused their investigation on a particular suspect. Moreover,
because the employee was killed as a result of the assailant's act, his
testimony concerning the circumstances of his death was not avail-
able, rendering the assault truly unexplained.
The burden upon the employee to demonstrate compensability
based on the assailant's motivation is complicated by the problem of
an unidentified assailant. Alternative resolutions of the problem in
relationship to the principal issue of compensability are not satisfac-
tory. Failure of the claimant to carry his burden as to motivation
could be deemed fatal in all cases, including those in which the claim-
ant simply has insufficient data concerning the assailant to allege a
claim in good faith. In many cases, this approach unjustly penalizes
those claimants who'have suffered the most severe injury, including
death, and wholly fails to promote the Act's goal of liberal interpreta-
tion for the benefit of workers. 87 Conversely, excusing the claimant's
burden in those cases in which the assailant's identity is unknown, but
retaining the burden in all other cases might encourage subterfuge on
the part of claimants likely to be deprived of benefits by disclosure of
the identity and motive of the assailant.
Apart from these considerations, the inherent unfairness of re-
quiring the claimant to solve criminal offenses that cannot be solved
186. 654 S.W.2d at 421.
187. See concurring opinion of McGee, J. in Waiters, 654 S.W.2d at 430 (citing Huffman
v. Southern Underwriters, 139 Tex. 354, 128 S.W.2d 4 (1939)).
906 [Vol. 16:875
UNEXPLAINED ACCIDENTS
by law enforcement agencies charged with the responsibilities of in-
vestigation and prosecution also appears contrary to both public pol-
icy and a liberal interpretation of the Act. 88 Predicating the success
of the claimant's case on the competence, diligence, or success of law
enforcement officials similarly charged with identifying criminal of-
fenders would at best reward claimants haphazardly and randomly.
B. Proof of the Assailant's Motive
Even if the identity of the assailant is known, the problem of
determining compensability based on the assailant's motivation is still
not solved. The reasons are simple. First, an assailant's motivation
may or may not be revealed even if he is apprehended. In Commer-
cial Standard Insurance Co. v. Marin,'89 for instance, the confession
of the assailant provided no clear motivation for his attack and failed
to demonstrate either a personal or an employment-related basis. 190
Second, the assailant may simply elect to exercise his Fifth Amend-
ment right not to testify or make any incriminating statement.' 9'
Although identified, his motivation may be undisclosed by virtue of
his insulation from meaningful cross-examination. Third, even if the
assailant makes a statement, voluntarily testifies, or is coerced into
disclosure, problems arise because the source of the testimony inher-
ently lacks credibility. Conceivably, the assailant will design testi-
mony to protect himself from criminal liability, suggesting the
possibility of fabricated defenses to the criminal charges which, if be-
lieved in the collateral civil proceedings, would deprive worthy claim-
ants of their just recovery. Similarly, the statement of the criminal
offender may generally lack credibility based on the character of the
accused demonstrated by his criminal activity.
A further problem in requiring proof of the assailant's motiva-
tion is suggested by Travelers Insurance Co. v. Hampton.1 92 There,
188. The public policy issue focuses on the extent to which a burden can legitimately be
placed on a citizen to essentially solve a crime thus far unsolved by law enforcement agencies.
189. 488 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
190. Id. at 863.
191. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Matin, the parties to the civil action had use not only of
the assailant's confession, but also of his deposition. The assailant, thus, waived his rights
under the fifth amendment, whether or not the waiver might properly have been deemed
"knowing and intelligent." 488 S.W.2d at 863.
192. 414 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1967, writ refd n.r.e.). See also Cum-
mings v. United Resort Hotels, Inc., 85 Nev. 23, 449 P.2d 245 (1969) (holding injury compen-
sable where employee fatally stabbed by fellow employee suffering from mental illness, where
employer had actual or constructive knowledge of mentally ill employee's condition.)
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the employee was killed along with his co-worker as they closed and
locked the store.193 The assailant was the co-worker's insane
cousin. 9 4 The cousin's insanity negated the presence of a deliberate
intent or a rational motivation for the assault, therefore, recovery was
not denied even though the assault did not arise from the employment
or conditions of work. 195 Similarly, a Pennsylvania court, while ap-
parently focusing on the assailant's motivation in determining com-
pensability in Cleland Simpson Co. v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Board, 96 noted that when the assault is committed by an irra-
tional, insane coworker for reasons not necessarily arising from em-
ployment, recovery is available to the injured employee.' 97
The limitation applied to third party assaults based on insanity
or lack of capacity can be reconciled with the definitions of culpability
employed by the Texas Penal Code, 198 but suggest a greater set of
problems. For example, when the identity of the assailant is un-
known, the worthy employee may well be deprived of recovery under
the Act, although recovery would be available upon proof that the
assailant acted irrationally or insanely. 99 The degree of culpability
required for exclusion on the basis of third party acts, moreover, indi-
cates the need for determinations more appropriately assigned to
criminal proceedings than proceedings under the compensation stat-
ute.2 °" The lack of apparent motive in many unexplained assault
193. 414 S.W.2d at 713.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 717.
196. 16 Pa. Commw. 566, 332 A.2d 862 (1975) (construing 77 PA. STAT. 411) (Purdon
Supp. 1984-85)). Compare Cleland Simpson with Toler v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Ariz. App.
365, 527 P.2d 767 (1974) (in which the employee assailant was intoxicated at the time of an
unprovoked assault). The court specifically looked to the lack of prior animosity between the
assailant and injured employee in upholding compensation. The Cleland court would have
apparently excuded coverage in a similar situation had the assailant's motivation been demon-
strated to be unrelated to any employment aspect, unless the level of intoxication would have
rendered the assailant wholly incapable of forming an intent.
197. 16 Pa. Commw. at -, 332 A.2d at 865.
198. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.02-.03 (Vernon 1974) defines the degrees of culpability
and requirement of culpability to establish a criminal act.
199. Id.
200. For example, in Walters, the only medico-legal conclusion concerning cause of death
was the pathologist's finding that the death was a homicide. 636 S.W.2d at 795; 654 S.W.2d at
425, 429. The court of appeals apparently accepted the insurer's argument that a finding of
homicide necessarily established murder in noting: "If there is one thing certain in this case,
Justice's death was not an accident." 636 S.W.2d at 797. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01
(Vernon 1974), however, defines five distinct degrees of "criminal homicide," all of which
require proof of a culpable mental state. Unsolved offenses simply cannot be characterized
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cases might also lead to a logical inference that any assault resulting
in injury necessarily stems from a degree of irrationality or insanity.
Although this conclusion is not supported by the general approach of
the Penal Code,2"' it might be deemed viable in terms of assessing the
credibility or merit of a defense to a compensation action based on a
third party assault.
C. Proof of Course and Scope of Employment in
Questionable Cases
Problems associated with failure to identify the assailant and de-
termine the motivation for the assault are accentuated when the
threshold determination of the employee's connection with work at
the time of the assault is itself an issue in the case.2°2 Some jurisdic-
tions appear to have resolved the unexplained assault cases, at least
partially, by simply requiring the claimant to demonstrate a nexus
between the assault and the employee's employment, as illustrated by
the New York court in Seymour v. Rivera Appliances Corp. 203 This
nexus may be established by simply showing that the assault occurred
while the employee was performing the duties of employment, even
though the assault cannot be shown to have been attributable to the
employee's working environment. 2°  This position was taken by the
Maryland Court of Appeals in Giant Food, Inc. v. Gooch.2°5 There,
the Maryland court held compensable the injuries sustained by an em-
ployee shot by a jealous husband who erroneously believed the em-
ployee had been having an affair with the assailant's wife.20 6  The
shooting occurred on the employer's parking lot when the employee
within the context of the penal code categorization precisely because the degree of criminal
intent cannot be accurately established except in the context of a criminal trial, which requires
some "solution" of the offense producing an accused, or defendant. Id.
201. Under Texas criminal law, proof of motive is not an essential element of the offense
unless specifically required by the statutory language defining the offense. Motiveless offenses,
however, are not necessarily the products of irrationality or insanity. Texas law defines in-
sanity as a defense only when the actor suffers from a "mental disease or defect" rendering him
incapable of knowing that his conduct was wrong or of conforming his conduct to the require-
ments of the law violated.
202. See, e.g., Waiters, 654 S.W.2d at 427 (facts unclear whether assault committed during
employment).
203. 28 N.Y.2d 406, 271 N.E.2d 224, 322 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1971) (fatal shooting of employee
who had intervened in fight between co-employees at work on preceding day compensable
when assailant was participant in prior day's argument).
204. 271 N.E.2d at 225.
205. 245 Md. 160, 225 A.2d 431 (1967).
206. 245 Md. at -, 225 A.2d at 432.
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was not actually engaged in his duties of employment.20 7 Neverthe-
less, because the court determined that the assault had occurred while
the employee was going to perform the duties of his employment, the
injuries were held to have occurred while the employee was acting in
the course of his employment and thus compensable under the Mary-
land statute.
20 8
The Gooch court's approach has not been uniformly adopted in
assault cases apparently because of less favorable legislation in other
jurisdictions.20 9 However, in most situations the variance in judicial
interpretation is focused on the motivation for the assault because the
facts suggest a strong correlation between the place of the assault and
the employee's employment. The distinguishing feature is, therefore,
whether the appellate court and legislature view the locational nexus
as sufficient to justify compensation,2 10 or require a showing that the
assault occurred not only in the course of employment, but arose from
the employment.
21 1
The more difficult problem is posed by facts in which the injuries
are sustained away from the normal place or hours of employment,
207. Id.
208. Id. The court construed MD. CODE ANN. art. 101, §§ 15, 67 & (6) (1957), to negate
the distinctions between injuries arising out of employment and those merely occurring in the
course of employment.
209. E.g., Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350 (1972) (on-the-job shooting
of wife and co-employee by jealous husband held not compensable because their deaths did not
"arise of the employment"). See also Belden Hotel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 44 Ill. 2d 253,
255 N.E.2d 439 (1970) (holding on-the-job shooting of employee by jealous husband of hotel
maid not compensable as arising out of and in the course of employment).
210. See Gooch, 225 A.2d at 431; Seymour, 271 N.E.2d at 224. See also Inland Mfg. Div.,
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lawson, 14 Ohio Misc. 129, 232 N.E.2d 657, affid, 15 Ohio App. 192,
240 N.E.2d 100, 102 (1967) (employee injured in fall while she was leaving cafeteria located on
empoyer's premises held to be entitled to workmen's compensation benefits).
211. Texas courts have applied the arising from employment standard. See, e.g., Moore v.
Means, 549 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (mere fact
that employer is injured by another employee at work does not in and of itself make the injury
compensable). Cf Deatherage, 628 S.W.2d at 210 (opinion of court of appeals on remand)
(stating that under certain circumstances, worker's compensation beneficiaries may be entitled
to presumption of course of employment). This standard was initially applied by the court of
appeals in Walters, 636 S.W.2d at 796. Accord Dufloth v. City of Monticello, 241 N.W.2d 645
(Minn. 1976) (construing statute to require proof of more than mere presence of employee at
employment to show that assault was in some sense causally related to employment); Lathrop
v. Tobin-Hamilton Shoe Mfg. Co., 402 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. App. 1966) (liability for assault occur-
ring while employee at work but not resulting from employment directly requires showing of
some risk inherent in employment to which general public is not exposed); Wood v. Aetna Cas.
and Sur. Co., 116 Ga. App. 284, 157 S.E.2d 60 (1967) (fatal shooting of assistant manager at
grocery store by husband of former employee did not arise out of employment).
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either because the employment situation itself is susceptible to fluctua-
tion in terms of duties performed or because the place of performance
is subject to change. Thus, in Freeman,21 2 the Texas Supreme Court
held that the deceased suffered his fatal injuries while in the perform-
ance of a special mission at the bequest or instruction of his employer,
rather than extending the travel exception to deprive his heirs of bene-
fits.2 13 In General Fire and Casualty Co. v. Bellflower,214 the Georgia
Court of Appeals considered facts typical of irregular employment.
There, the injured employee, a bus driver, was shot by a stranger
while returning from a restaurant on a direct route to his hotel room,
which had been provided by his employer in compliance with a com-
pany policy.21 The driver was off duty at the time of the assault, but
technically subject to being called to duty at virtually any time while
on the road.21 6 It appears that the assault did not arise from any risk
to which the employee was uniquely exposed because of his employ-
ment. The court's reasoning was apparently tailored to fit the irregu-
larity of his employment in terms of hours and place of work, a result
which would have probably been different for an employee working in
a more regular context and assaulted while traveling between a local
restaurant and his home.217
Irregular employment may be subject to more liberal interpreta-
tion than employment which requires the employee to perform his
duties at a specific location during normal hours of employment. To
some extent the Bellflower reasoning may reflect the same judicial
concern with problems peculiar to employment which is not fixed by
time and place, much as the caretaker/watchman cases suggest a flex-
ible judicial perspective with regard to the definition of customary du-
ties of employment to afford compensation for injuries sustained while
the employee is simply on or near the property, performing the func-
tion of guarding the property even while engaged in personal
activities.218
212. 603 S.W.2d at 192.
213. Id. at 193.
214. 123 Ga. App. 864, 182 S.E.2d 678 (1971). See also Olinger Const. Co. v. Mosbey, 427
N.E.2d 910 (Ind. App. 1981) (court found employee who died from accident that occurred in a
motel room while away from home arose out of and in course of his employment because
employee was away from home because of his work).
215. 123 Ga. App. at -, 182 S.E.2d at 680.
216. Id. (applying GA. CODE § 114-102 (1973)).
217. Cf Caddell, 644 S.W.2d 884 (employee held within the scope of employment when
traveling from job site to office).
218. Shook, 44 S.W.2d at 425.
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The Walters case2 19 also presents an unusual set of facts compli-
cating the threshold decision whether the assault has a sufficient rela-
tionship to the employment to justify a finding of the nexus essential
to recovery under whatever standard is adopted by the Texas courts.
In Walters the evidence suggested that the employee accompanied his
employer, at the latter's direction, on a excursion to make a business
presentation. 22° The circumstances of the excursion were sufficient to
result in the jury's affirmative answer to the special issue inquiring
whether the injuries were sustained by the employee while engaged in
his employment. However, the absence of direct evidence concerning
the actual assault and the deaths of both the employee and employer
left the claimant without any direct evidence of the facts surrounding
the fatal assault or motivation of the assailant. 221 This type of situa-
tion, which might be readily indentified with the manner in which
professionals conduct business activity, particularly in terms of client
negotiations and relations, may present problems of proof simply be-
cause the employee subjected to the unexplained assault may not be
able to establish a necessary relationship between the assault and his
employment, such as is normally present when the assault occurs at
the workplace during usual hours of employment. However, recovery
should not be precluded simply because the working pattern of the
employee does not fit within easily recognized concepts of the work-
place, because the workplace may well be dictated by the demands of
the employer and nature of the employment.2 22 Flexibility in viewing
alternative work situations and environments is, therefore, critical if
worthy claimants are not to be denied recovery simply because the
unexplained nature of the assault fails to demonstrate a necessary re-
lationship to the place or hours of employment.
V. ALLOCATING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
The central problem in all unexplained death or injury cases con-
219. 654 S.W.2d at 423.
220. Id. at 426-27.
221. Id. at 427.
222. For example, in Graybeal v. Board of Supervisors, 216 Va. 77, 216 S.E.2d 52 (1975),
the court held that injuries sustained by a prosecutor from a bombing at his home at night by
an accused he had prosecuted were compensable. Clearly, the motivation for the assault could
be attributable to his performance of duties required by employment. But see Barnes v.
Panaro, 238 A.2d 608 (Del. 1968), in which the court held that a bartender injured at home
after working hours by a bottle thrown by an individual with whom he had had an altercation
while at work earlier the same day could not recover under the applicable statute.
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cerns the allocation of the burden of either proving nonapplicability of
the alternative statutory bases for exclusion from coverage, or the ap-
plicability of the exclusion. In proving the nonapplicability of an ex-
clusion, the claimant is confronted with the problem of essentially
proving a negative fact-that the cause of death or injury is not recog-
nized by the statutory exclusions as not justifying an award of com-
pensation. With respect to the applicability of an exclusion, the
burden is placed on the insurer to prove that the cause of the injury
falls within that group of causes for which compensation is not justi-
fied. The determination that legislation should be interpreted to allo-
cate the burden in either direction will ultimately pose special
problems of proof for claimants or insurers because the critical feature
of the unexplained injury case is that it is unexplained in some signifi-
cant sense, either as to causality in the immediate sense, or as to moti-
vation or purpose in the ultimate sense. The starting point for
analysis of unexplained death or injury cases, as in all cases, is the
claimant's threshold burden of demonstrating that the injury was sus-
tained while the claimant was in the performance of his duties, or in
the course and scope of the duties of his employment.
A. The Claimant's Burden to Prove the Injury is Sustained in the
Course and Scope of Employment
The threshold burden for claimant's seeking compensation under
the Texas statute is aptly expressed by the language of the appropriate
approved instruction:
"Injury in the course of employment" means any injury having to
do with and originating in the work, business, trade, or profession
of the employer, received by an employee while engaged in or
about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer,
whether upon the employer's premises or elsewhere.223
The instruction provides a broad sense of the relationship between the
injury-producing event and the worker's employment as the focal
point for establishing the worker's right to recovery under the Act.
The definition provided also suggests depths of the problem which
must be considered in individual cases. For example, the definition
does not limit recovery for injuries to those sustained on the em-
ployer's premises, 21 as might be expected by an historical reading of
the intent expressed in worker compensation legislation. However,
223. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATFERN JURY CHARGES PJC 21.10 (1970).
224. Id.
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the definition does not expressly deal with situations in which the in-
juries sustained occur in places other than the workplace or on the
employer's premises. This opens up a wide range of activities for in-
terpretation by the appellate courts, particularly when the normal ac-
tivities of the employee are in some sense transient. For instance, in
London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. McCoy,2 2 the Colorado
Supreme Court considered an unusual case involving a traveling sales-
man who stopped at the home of a friend to make a telephone call
necessary for business. While in the home, the friend's father-in-law
became homicidal and killed the employee and threatened his wife
and daughters. 226 The court concluded that the death was compensa-
ble because the duties of employment placed the deceased in a place
which exposed him to the criminal attack at that particular time.22 7
This type of broad interpretation of work-relatedness of the injury,
particularly when the injury-producing event is an assault committed
by a third person for a reason apparently unrelated to the employ-
ment, suggests the extent to which the duties of employment may ex-
pand the potential range of cases resulting in recovery beyond the
standard view of the workplace. 228 The McCoy decision is perhaps no
more bizarre than Cuellar,2 29 in which a Texas court of appeals held
an insect sting compensable because the employee's work exposed him
to the sting of the particular insect by placing him in a location in
which the sting could and did occur.2 3 °
Similarly, the limitation upon recovery to those injuries sustained
while the employee is engaged in or about the furtherance of his em-
225. 97 Colo. 13, 45 P.2d 900 (1935).
226. Id. at -, 45 P.2d at 901.
227. Id. at -, 45 P.2d at 902. Compare McCoy with Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hampton, 414
S.W.2d 712, (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employee killed by co-em-
ployee's insane cousin held compensable); Cleland Simpson Co. v. Workmen's Compensation
Appeal Bd., 332 A.2d 862 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (injury or death by insane, irrational fellow
worker is compensable). See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
228. Of course, the facts in McCoy deal with employment requiring travel and consequent
exposure to a greater range of risks than those which might normally be associated with em-
ployment at a single work place. Cf Bellflower, 123 Ga. App. at 864, 182 S.E.2d at 678 (when
the nature of employment requires the employee to confront the risks of the street to which the
general public may also be exposed, injuries sustained as a consequence of exposure to those
risks are compensable). See also Jecker v. Western Alliance Ins. Co., 369 S.W.2d 776, 778
(Tex. 1963) (when an injury occurs to the employee while traveling on public streets and the
trip was pursuant to an expressed requirement of his employment contract, the injury is con-
sidered to arise out of employment for compensation purposes).
229. 468 S.W.2d at 880.
230. Id. at 883.
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ployer's interests raises interesting issues concerning joint missions or
situations in which a personal motive may be discerned from the em-
ployee's acts, as well as a motive arising from the employment.231
The determination that the employee is engaged in the furtherance of
his employer's interests is often difficult in those cases which do not
occur on the employer's premises during normal hours of employ-
ment. Texas courts have held, in light of the problems in determining
the nature of the employee's activity at the time of death or injury,
that the purpose of the employee's activities may be established by
statements made by the employee prior to the time of the injury con-
cerning his activity.232
The problem of discerning the employee's concerns in a difficult
case has suggested an approach favoring compensation on part of
Texas courts. The Tyler Court of Appeals considered an unexplained
death case in American States Insurance Co. v. CaddelP33 which
presented several problems, including applicability of the coming and
going exclusion and travel exception to that general rule and the
problems of proof for claimants seeking recovery in death cases. The
employee apparently traveled at the direction of his supervisor in the
business, yet at the time of his death it was uncertain whether he was
merely returning home after completing his work, or returning to
continue work at his office at home. 234 The mission undertaken, how-
ever, was totally motivated by employment and not by personal rea-
sons.235 The evidence pointed to the employment motive for the trip
and also to the conclusion that the employee was prepared to continue
work at home at the completion of his trip.2 36 Because the insurer
appealed only on a no evidence point of error,237 the court of appeals
231. See Caddell, 644 S.W.2d at 887 (discussion of dual purpose doctrine).
232. Statements made by the employee tending to show his state of mind and immediate
purpose are admissible to demonstrate an employment motivation for subsequent acts. Wal-
ters, 654 S.W.2d at 427 (citing Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Elledge, 312 S.W.2d 722, 724 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1958), aff'd, 159 Tex. 228, 320 S.W.2d 328, 329 (1959)). See also Mid-
Continent Casualty Co. v. Conrad, 368 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (testimony that deceased had said he was having trouble with the truck he was
road testing for his employer prior to the accident was admissible to show state of mind and
immediate purpose).
233. 644 S.W.2d 884.
234. Id. at 887-88.
235. Id. at 887.
236. Id. at 887-88.
237. See Calvert, supra note 150, at 362-65. When reviewing no evidence points, Texas
appellate courts are required to consider only evidence supporting the verdict and all reason-
able inferences supporting that verdict and to disregard all contrary evidence and inferences.
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indulged all inferences favorable to the claimant to construe that there
was at least some evidence to support the jury verdict for the em-
ployee.23 In this circumstance the employee's beneficiaries prevailed,
at least in part, because of the phrasing of appellant's point of error.
Had the insurer raised an issue related to factual insufficiency of the
evidence supporting the conclusion that the employee was not merely
returning home after work, the court of appeals could have decided
the case adversely to the claimant.239 Caddell demonstrates not only
the problem of proof in the unexplained death case, but the necessity
for properly presenting evidentiary sufficiency issues for appellate re-
view to obtain the most favorable posture for review from the court of
appeals. 2"
The significance of interplay between the evidence available and
the approach taken by an appellant on appeal in a difficult case is
illustrated by the disposition of the Deatherage appeal.2 4 There, the
issue central to the litigation was whether the injury arose from the
worker's employment as a watchman on his employer's property. 42
The Texas Supreme Court, considering the lower court's reversal of
the claimant's jury verdict based on the insurer's no evidence point of
error, ruled that there was legally admissible evidence introduced
which would support the jury finding that the worker suffered his
Elliot v. Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 611 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1981); Stodgill v. Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n, 582 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1979).
238. 644 S.W.2d at 886.
239. See Deatherage, 628 S.W.2d at 210.
240. The Caddell court noted:
Appellant's first point of error complains that the trial court erred in overruling de-
fendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was no evi-
dence, or in the alternative, factually insufficient evidence that Bennie Caddell was
within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his death. We construe
this point of error as raising only a "no evidence" point.
644 S.W.2d at 886 (emphasis added) (citing Calvert, supra note 150, at 362). Because a no
evidence point limits the court's review to evidence favorable to the verdict only, the Caddell
court disposed of this issue by holding that, reviewing the evidence "in light most favorable to
the verdict and judgment," there was "some evidence that Caddell was within the course of his
employment at the time of his death." 644 S.W.2d at 888. By attempting to combine the no
evidence and factual insufficiency points of error, appellant's counsel apparently committed a
grave strategic error. Construction of the point by the court as a no evidence point resulted in
application of the most rigorous standard of review against the insurer. Had the court ruled
favorably on the point, however, counsel would have permitted further appeal to the supreme
court without reserving the right to subsequent review on remand. See Deatherage, 615
S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1981), on remand, 628 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
241. 615 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1981), on remand, 628 S.w.2d 209 (Tex. App. Austin 1982, no
writ).
242. 615 S.W.2d at 181.
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death while in the course and scope of his employment.24 3 On re-
mand to the Austin Court of Appeals, however, the claimant was
once again deprived of his verdict. 2 ' That court held that the evi-
dence was factually insufficient to support the jury finding since the
evidence failed to demonstrate that the injury sustained by the em-
ployee resulted from an accident which necessarily arose during the
course of employment.245 The court held:
The requirements of the statute are not satisfied by proof that in-
jury occurred while the workman was engaged in or about the fur-
therance of his employer's affairs or business. He must also show
that the injury was of a kind and character that had to do with and
originated in the employer's work, trade, business, or profession
. . . . It was appellee's burden, of course, to prove that her hus-
band's death occurred in the course of employment.246
The court explained its reasoning:
An injury has to do with, and arises out of the work or business of
the employer, when it necessarily results from a risk or hazard
which is necessarily, or ordinarily, or reasonably inherent in or in-
cident to the conduct of such work or business. Compensation law
protects the employee against the risk or hazard taken in order to
perform the employer's task.247
The court observed that certain circumstances, including death by as-
sault or during a conflagration at the plant a watchman is employed
to protect, would justify compensation. 24  However, the court also
concluded that simply because the employee died in a fire at a trailer
in which he lived while watching his employer's property the claimant
did not establish a sufficient connection between the duties of employ-
ment and circumstances of the death to justify an award of compensa-
tion. 249 The court's conclusion proscribes an ultimately impossible
burden of proof for the claimant. 2 ° There would appear no greater
justification for assuming that an assaulted watchman died while per-
243. Id. at 183.
244. 628 S.W.2d at 209.
245. Id. at 211.
246. Id. at 210.
247. Id. at 211.
248. Id.
249. Id. The court essentially held that the claimant had failed to discharge her burden of
proving that her husband's death occurred in the scope of his employment, citing Service Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Banke, 155 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1941, writ refd), for the
general rule regarding the burden of proof in worker's compensation cases. 628 S.W.2d at 210.
250. See, e.g., Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Elledge, 320 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1959)
(nightwatchman's unexplained death on employer's premises compensable).
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forming his duties-absent some evidence of robbery of the em-
ployer's property; for example, than that Deatherage died as a result
of a risk inherent in living in quarters provided on his employer's
property. Yet, in Shook,2"' another court of appeals had been willing
to draw exactly such a conclusion in an assault case on the theory that
the employee's duties required continuing vigilance while on or near
the property. Even assuming the court of appeals correctly decided
Deatherage on the facts, the case is troublesome because of the
problems of proof inherent in watchman cases which, by their very
nature, are likely to be dependent upon reconstruction of a fatal acci-
dent or assault through circumstantial evidence only.25 2
B. The Burden of Proof in Unexplained Death and Injury Cases
The significance of allocation of the burden of proof in unex-
plained cases is critical since it will likely be determinative of recovery
for deserving claimants. This is true even though other factors, such
as failure to properly plead, failure to protect the record on specially
requested issues or instructions, or mistakes in presentation of issues
for appellate review may result in recovery in cases which otherwise
might be lost because of evidentiary problems. When the facts sur-
rounding an accidental or intentional injury or assault can only be
determined speculatively or, at best, circumstantially, allocation of
the burden of proof with respect to the threshold issue of whether the
injury was sustained in the course of employment will necessarily cre-
ate problems of proof for either claimants or insurers. For example,
the absence of direct evidence concerning an employee's apparently
accidental death may create a significant hurdle in demonstrating the
connection or nexus between the injury-producing event and the em-
ployment.2 53 In cases in which the death or injury can be fairly char-
acterized as "accidental" the claimant's burden can be met by
showing sufficient facts to establish the nexus. Accidental deaths or
injuries which occur at the workplace and during the normal hours of
employment would appear to present the easiest cases since the nexus
is almost necessarily established by the context in which the injury is
251. Southern Sur. Co. v. Shook, 44 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ
ref'd).
252. This problem suggests the desirability of adoption of the presumption favoring recov-
ery in unexplained death or injury cases. See supra note 36.
253. For example, the exact time of death in Deatherage, 615 S.W.2d at 182, was inconclu-
sive and established by circumstantial evidence based on the decedent's last contacts with




In cases of death or injury apparently sustained as a result of
intentional acts committed by third persons, however, the burden of
proof becomes a more complex matter. Clearly, the claimant remains
under the general burden of proving that the injury has been sustained
by the employee in the course of employment. 255 However, because of
the statutory exclusion for injuries arising from assaults attributable
to personal, nonemployment motives, a secondary problem of proof
exists in these cases.256 Whether the burden is placed upon the claim-
ant to establish that the motivation of the assault was related to em-
ployment or upon the insurer to prove a nonemployment motivation
will make a substantial difference in resolution of difficult, unex-
plained cases. The truly unexplained case, so characterized because of
the lack of facts concerning the assailant, his motivation, or his prior
relationship with either the employee or the employer, suggests a seri-
ous problem for the claimant required to establish that his injury was
not the result of some motivation unrelated to employment.
The difference between unexplained accidents and unexplained
assaults indicates the disparity in treatment given claimants when the
court simply engages in characterization of the injury-producing
event and does so improperly. If the injury-producing event should
correctly be characterized as "accidental" in nature but some fact
suggests assault as the possible explanation for the event, characteri-
zation of the event as an assault necessarily increasing the claimant's
burden of proof will result in unfairness to an otherwise worthy claim-
ant. Conversely, mischaracterization of the injury-producing event as
an accident may lessen the burden of proof placed upon potentially
worthy or unworthy claimants. Further, the problem in terminology
may be accentuated by the parameters given the term "accident." '257
254. In Sandmeyer v. City of Bemidji, 281 Minn. 217, 161 N.W.2d 318 (1968), for in-
stance, the court held that a fatal injury sustained by a police officer during off-duty target
practice was compensable based on departmental policy encouraging such practice, even
though it was not sustained during the employee's normal hours of employment.
255. Deatherage, 615 S.W.2d at 182.
256. Justice McGee, in his concurring opinion in Walters, observed: "I am, however, per-
suaded that basic fairness justifies a relaxation of the claimant's burden of proof in cases of
unexplained assaults, particularly when the victim's death has removed the only possible wit-
ness." 654 S.W.2d at 430.
257. Consider the characterization of a fatal shooting of an employer as an accident within
the meaning of the applicable statute in In re Robinson, 23 Or. App. 126, 541 P.2d 506 (1975).
Accord Lustgarten v. Victor Pulmbing Supply, 61 A.D.2d 875, 402 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1978);
Conyers v. Rush Bar, 38 A.D.2d 987, 329 N.Y.S.2d 168, (App. Div., 1972).
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One of the concerns of the Texas Supreme Court expressed during the
oral argument of the WalterS2 5a case involved whether the death of an
employee from an apparent assault by a third party might properly be
deemed an accident as to that employee if the assailant's motive for
the assaultive act was actually directed at another employee or an-
other person.25 9 Because the employee killed in the Walters case ap-
parently accompanied his employer on the business trip and the
employer was also found dead, a motive directed at the employer
which resulted in both their deaths might be viewed as an "accident"
with respect to the employee. 2 ° In essence, because the employer was
the object of the assault, the fact of the employee's involvement in the
overall sequence of events which left him dead was, in a sense, an
accident, if only because the assault could have probably occurred in
other circumstances not involving the employee. This type of result is
suggested by the facts in Hampton,26' which was decided on other
grounds. There, the assailant was related to the coworker who was
also killed in the attack.262 Had the claimant not been present with
the coworker at the time of the assault, it appears likely he would not
have been killed by the cousin, whose acts were shown to be the prod-
uct of his insanity. Another similarly broad definition of accident is
suggested by the facts developed in In re Peters' Case,2 63 a Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court decision. There, the injured employee
was having lunch with a co-worker who was a union official.2 6 A
former employee confronted the co-worker, who advised the claimant
to run and call the police. 265 The former employee caught the claim-
ant as he ran and assaulted him.2 66 Although the case did not turn on
the characterization of the incident as an accident,267 the facts lend
themselves to the view that the employee suffered injury accidentally,
258. 654 S.W.2d at 423.
259. In Walters, the court of appeals expressly rejected the claimant's reliance on Deather-
age, concluding that the employee's death was not an accident and, thus, that the accidental
death presumption recognized in Deatherage was inapplicable. 636 S.W.2d at 797.
260. Thus, in a sense, accident might be applied to any injury sustained by an assaulted
employee whom the specific intent of the actor was not to inflict injury on the employee.
261. 414 S.W.2d at 712.
262. Id.
263. 362 Mass. 888, 291 N.E.2d 158 (1972).
264. 362 Mass. 888, 291 N.E.2d at 158.
265. Id.
266. 362 Mass. 888, 291 N.E.2d at 158-59.




not being the object of the initial confrontation, and apparently only
because he happened to be present at the time of the original difficul-
ties between his co-worker and the assailant.
1. The Presumption in Accidental Death or Injury Cases
Although most unexplained accidents resulting in death or injury
at the job site during the normal hours of employment can be resolved
without difficulty, problems emerge when the workplace is not stan-
dardized or defined by duties of employment uniformly performed by
numbers of employees working together. Typically, the accidental
death or injury cases which present problems in terms of proof are
those involving employees working in isolated circumstances or
whose duties require travel or performance of individualized work. In
those cases, the claimant may have a difficult time in establishing that
the accident was sustained in the course of employment.
The disposition of the Deatherage case by the court of appeals
after an initial reversal in the Texas Supreme Court illustrates the
type of problem often faced by claimants forced to demonstrate not
only that the accident was sustained during performance of the duties
of employment, but also that it arose from the nature of risks inherent
in employment itself.268 The supreme court discussed, but did not
apply, the recognized presumption which is available in unexplained
accidental death cases in Texas:
When an employee is found dead at a place where his duties re-
quire him to be, or where he might properly have been in the per-
formance of his duties, during the hours of his work, it has been
said that in the absence of evidence that he was not engaged in his
master's business, there is presumption that the accident arose out
of and in the course of the employment within the meaning of the
compensation statute.269
Interestingly, the court held that this presumption, recognized in
Scott v. Millers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. ,270 was not applicable in Deather-
age since there was some evidence supporting the jury finding that the
death occurred while the employee was engaged in his employer's
business.27 On remand, however, the court of appeals concluded that
that evidence was insufficient to support the verdict factually272 and,
268. 628 S.W.2d at 210.
269. 615 S.W.2d at 183. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 24.10.
270. 524 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. 1974).
271. 615 S.W.2d at 183.
272. 628 S.W.2d at 211.
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because review of factual insufficiency claims are committed exclu-
sively to the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals,2 73 it appears the
claimant erred in providing any evidence instead of relying on the
presumption entirely. If the opinion on remand withstands further
scrutiny, problems of proof for claimants may be complicated by the
strategic decision of whether the case should be predicated on avail-
able evidence or reliance on the presumption recognized but not ap-
plied in Deatherage.1
74
Apart from the presumption which may be available to claimants
in unexplained accidental death cases, other expressions of law favor
those employees most likely to be injured in factually unexplained ac-
cidents. For instance, Larson cites a general rule concerning watch-
man and caretaker cases which expresses reasoning similar to that
relied on by the court in Southern Surety Co. v. Shook:
275
When an employee is required to live on the premises, either by his
contract of employment or by the nature of the employment, and is
continuously on call [whether or not actually on duty], the entire
period of his presence on the premises pursuant to this requirement
is deemed included in this course of employment.276
This rule broadly interprets the duties of employment of the caretaker
to reflect the employer's actual interest in his duties and residence on
the premises, that is, the prevention or detection of potential injury to
the employer's property. By fashioning the rule to mirror the reality
of the employer's interest in employing the worker, Larson and sub-
scribing courts demonstrate a clear preference for compensating wor-
thy claimants rather than protecting against unjustified recovery by
unworthy claimants.
2 77
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court has recognized a rule of law
favorable to those employees whose injuries are likely to result from
273. Calvert, supra note 150, at 369. See also Strange v. Treasure City, 608 S.W.2d 604,
610 (Tex. 1980) (Texas Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to consider factual sufficiency points
of error); Sagebrush Sales Co. v. Strauss, 605 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tex. 1980) (factual insuffi-
ciency points are within exclusive jurisdiction of the court of civil appeals).
274. For a discussion of the analogy between assault and accident cases and the effect of
presumptions, compare the majority and concurring supreme court opinions in Walters, 654
S.W.2d at 425-26, 429-30.
275. 44 S.W.2d at 425.
276. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 24.00. See also Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Estep, 501
S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973, writ ref'd. n.r.e.) (applying similar reasoning to
that expressed by Larson).
277. This approach is consistent with a liberal interpretation of the Workers Compensa-




activity not uniquely associated with a workplace.278 This rule, relied
on by Justice Cadena in Matin,27 9 provides that "[a]lthough risks of
the street are dangers which an employee shares in common with the
general public, if the performance of his duties make it necessary for
the employee to be on the streets, the risks he there encounters are
held to be incident to his employment."2 This posture suggests that
the appellate courts favorably view those claimants able to demon-
strate that the accidental injury sustained occurred as a consequence
of their performance of duties exposing them to general risk of acci-
dent. The approach would also appear to favor claimants injured as a
result of intentional acts, if uniformly applied to all risks inherent in
daily activity encountered by the employee. However, the latter prop-
osition is dependent upon the allocation of the burden of proof with
regard to motive in assault cases; the "risks of the street" approach is
only favorable to those employee/claimants not required to disprove
existence of a nonemployment motive for the assaults causing their
injuries when proof of motivation is virtually impossible.
Although the cumulative impact of these expressions of law
would appear highly favorable to claimants, the court of appeals opin-
ion in Deatherage portrays the lack of favor with which individual
courts may view the paucity of evidence in unexplained cases.
28
Deatherage is difficult to reconcile, moreover, with the general ten-
dency of Texas courts to view both caretaker and accident claims with
favor. Given the prior cases and the type of reasoning displayed by
the court in Cuellar-"We think it clear that the insect sting was risk
or hazard of his employment and is compensable" 2 82-it is unreasona-
ble to assume that the Deatherage opinion on remand will ultimately
prove to be the definitive statement of law in unexplained accident
cases.
2. Unexplained Assault Cases-Problems for Claimants and
Insurers
The relative ease with which claimants may succeed in cases
readily characterized as accidents differs markedly from the uncer-
tainty and potential problems encountered in the assault cases. Be-
278. Jecker v. western Alliance Ins. Co.,369 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1963).
279. 488 S.W.2d at 861.
280. Id. at 869.
281. 628 S.W.2d at 210-11.
282. 468 S.W.2d at 883.
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cause the assault, or intentional act committed by a third person,
provides a theory for denial of compensation if proved by the evidence
to have resulted from a motivation not arising from the employment,
Texas courts have failed to reach a consensus concerning exactly how
the statutory exclusion should operate.
The lack of consensus can best be discerned through the differing
approaches taken by the court in Highlands Underwriters Insurance
Co. v. McGrath2 3 and by the commentary to the applicable section of
Texas Pattern Jury Charges.28 4 McGrath concerned a claim by de-
pendents of a truckdriver shot to death.285 The court distinguished
between employment serving as the cause of the attack as opposed to
the occasion for the attack in concluding:
The general rule is that if the assault is unconnected with the em-
ployment, or is for reasons personal to the assailant and the one
assaulted, or is not because the relation of employer and employee
exists, and the employment is not the cause, though it may be the
occasion, of the wrongful act, and may give a convenient opportu-
nity for its execution, it is ordinarily held that the injury does not
arise out of the employment. The burden of proof is upon the
claimant to show that an assault upon him was directed against him
as an employee or because of his employment.
286
The McGrath court's conclusion is, therefore, that the burden is upon
the claimant in the unexplained death or injury case and that burden
is to show an employment motivation for the assault.2 7 The practical
effect of the McGrath approach is to require the claimant to prove
that the assault did not occur for a reason unrelated to employment in
the unexplained case because the lack of evidence of the identity or
motive of the assailant would render proof of an employment motive
impossible in many cases. Even in Blair,2 s s for example, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court implied that evidence of robbery of the em-
ployee might have been a factor dictating a different result. Thus, the
mere suggestion that the assault is motivated by a reason extraneous
to employment, such as robbery, would require a claimant laboring
under the McGrath standard to disprove that the nonemployment
283. 485 S.W.2d at 593.
284. 2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 21.20 (1970)
(commentary).
285. 485 S.W.2d at 594.
286. Id. at 595 (emphasis added).
287. Id. at 596.
288. 496 P.2d at 796.
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motivation was the only motivation for the assault in order to sustain
his burden.
The position taken by the commentary to the pattern jury charge
would indicate a different test for the exclusion, based on construction
of the word "him" in the statute.28 9 Under the commentary's theory,
recovery would be denied only if the motivation were demonstrated as
personal to the employee. 29' Thus, those cases in which the assail-
ant's motive was not related to employment would result in denial of
benefits only if the motivation was also personal to the employee.291
The significance of the traditional reference to antecedent malice, a
concept implying some degree of relationship between the employee
and assailant antedating the assault, is apparent from the commentary
approach.29 2 Only in those cases in which a motivation personal to
the employee for the assault is demonstrated would recovery be un-
available; the claimant would never have any reason to suggest that
situation as part of his burden of proof. Once the commentary posi-
tion is adopted, the burden is clearly placed on the insurer to demon-
strate that the employee's death or injury truly resulted in an
assailant's motivation not related to the employee's work. The inno-
cent employee-innocent in the sense of the employee having no
knowledge of his assailant's apparent motivation-would be protected
in such cases from his own lack of knowledge, rather than penalized.
Other jurisdictions have dealt with the problem uniquely posed
by the unexplained assault either by creating a judicial presumption in
favor of the injured employee,293 or by creation of a statutory pre-
289. See supra note 163.
290. Id.
291. For example, in Vaughn, 130 S.W.2d at 395, the deceased was engaged in the duties
of his employment as a night watchman. He was killed, not because of any aspect of his
employment, but because of his assailant's personal animus toward him arising out of an on-
going family dispute. Accord Interstate United Corp. v. The Indus. Comm'n, 65 Ill. 2d 434,
358 N.E.2d 1137 (1976) (evidence failed to show that the assault was provoked by a dispute
with a customer rather than an argument with a fellow employee over matter not concerning
employment).
292. An interesting discussion of the antecedent malice theory is provided by the court in
Highlands, 485 S.W.2d at 596-97. The facts recounted in the Highlands lawsuit itself clearly
demonstrate antecedent malice existing between the deceased employee and his assailant, who
was identified in probability but not conclusively. Id. at 595-96.
293. The judicial presumption concept was advanced by Justice McGee in his concurring
opinion in Walters:
In my opinion, when the cause of death is the intentional act of an unknown assailant
whose motives cannot be discerned, these same facts should also give rise to a rebut-
table presumption that the assailant acted for reasons other than those personal to
9251985]
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sumption favoring the employee.294 This approach has by no means
been uniform, however, as Larson notes in his treatise.29 Other juris-
dictions seem to suggest that recovery is barred in cases in which the
assailant's motive, irrespective of the employee's knowledge or under-
standing of the reason for the motive, is shown to have no connection
with the employee's work.29 6 Under this formulation, of course, the
employee would be unable to overcome proof of a nonemployment
motivation on the part of the assailant except by presentation of con-
troverting evidence as to the motivation. No middle ground for the
innocent employee is recognized as justifying compensation.
Under any rule, it is almost certain that unworthy claimants will
collect in some unexplained assault cases, particularly when the as-
saults prove fatal, depriving the claimants of even that employee's tes-
timony denying any understanding of the reason for the assault.
Equally certain, of course, is the converse: any rule that places the
the employee. With the aid of such a presumption, the evidence is legally sufficient
to support the judgment on the jury's verdict.
654 S.W.2d at 430.
The Georgia Supreme Court, in Barge v. City of College Park, 148 Ga. App. 480, 251 S.E.2d
580 (1978), applied a presumption in holding compensation proper when a uniformed police
officer was killed in an execution-style slaying while on his way to work. The court concluded
that he was continuously on call and that the circumstances of his work and death combined
to create a presumption that his death arose out of and in the course of his employment. 148
Ga. App. 480, 251 S.E.2d at 582-83. Other courts have effectively recognized a type of pre-
sumption in applying the positional risk doctrine. See, e.g., McLean's Case, 323 Mass. 35, 80
N.E.2d 40, 43 (1948) (taxi driver beaten but not robbed, no apparent motive, held: injury
compensable because "employment brought him in contact with the risk that in fact caused his
injuries").
294. See, e.g., Slotnick v. Howard Stores Corp., 58 A.D.2d 959, 397 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1977)
(applying New York's statutory presumption that the accident arose out of the employment);
Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Gomes, 544 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1976) (applying Alaska's
statutory presumption that injury was work related); Allen v. Dorothy's Laundry & Dry
Cleaning Co., 523 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (1969 amendment eliminated the need of
an affirmative showing that an assault arose out of the employment in the case of a neutral,
unprovoked assault which arose in course of employment); Valenti v. Valenti, 28 A.D.2d 572,
279 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477 (1967) (applying New York's statutory presumption).
295. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 11, § 11.33.
296. See, e.g., Mullins v. Tanksleary, 376 P.2d 590, 591 (Okla. 1962) (suggesting in dicta
that an unexplained assault not compensable, limited by Burrell v. Prewitt, 445 P.2d 279, 281
(Okla. 1968) and further limited by Blair, 496 P.2d at 799). This approach was taken by the
court of appeals in Walters, 654 S.W.2d at 423. Cf Wolfe v. Shorey, 290 A.2d 892 (Me. 1972)
(employee assaulted during delivery of mail to post office had burden to show assault arose out
of employment or performance of duties of employment); American Brake Shoe Co. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 20 Ill.2d 132, 169 N.E.2d 256, 259 (1960) (burden of employee to show injury
resulted from horseplay on employer's premises could not be discharged in apparent assault
case by showing no prior discord, threats, or fights between claimant and coemployee). This
approach was taken by the court of appeals in Walters, 654 S.W,2d at 423.
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burden of proof regarding the motivation for the assault on claimants
will result in worthy claimants being deprived of benefits under the
Act because of inability to meet the burden in the unexplained case.
C. Procedural Requirements
Because there is conflict in the Texas courts of appeals regarding
the burden of proof in unexplained death or injury cases, both claim-
ant's and insurer's counsel must be careful to protect the record for
appeal as well as to protect their clients' interests at trial. At least
part of the problem in discerning the proper action at trial stems from
the unspecified nature of the problems of proof under the Act. For
example, the statutory exclusions for injuries resulting from acts of
God,29 7 voluntary intoxication,2"' fellow employee,29 or third party
assault, 300 and acts of employee aggression 30 1 are not defined as af-
firmative defenses under the Act with respect to pleading burdens.
30 2
Consequently, unresolved issues may remain with respect to the
proper approach to be taken by counsel with regard to pleading and
submission of requested special issues or instructions.
1. The Pleading Burden in Unexplained Death or Injury Cases
The general burden of pleading required in the unexplained
death or injury case is placed upon claimants to show facts demon-
strating that the injuries were sustained in the course of the em-
ployee's employment. Two problems flow from the initial pleading
burden. First, the pleading itself may demonstrate a possible exclu-
sion from coverage, such as when the petition shows that the worker
was injured by an apparent act of God or by an assault apparently
297. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(1) (Vernon 1967) (defining "injury sus-
tained in the course of employment"). See Traders and Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 263 S.W.2d 673,
675 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1953, writ refd).
298. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(3) (Vernon 1967). See Texas Employer's
Ins. Ass'n v. Monroe, 216 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
299. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, §§ 1(2), (4) (Vernon 1967). See Phoenix Ins.
Co. v. Bradley, 415 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, no writ).
300. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(2) (Vernon 1967). See Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Upton, 492 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth 1973, no writ).
301. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1(4) (Vernon 1967). See Kurtz v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 572 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, no writ).
302. See Ross, 263 S.W.2d 673, 675. See also Walters, 654 S.W.2d at 428-30 (McGee, J.,
concurring). Instead of affirmative defenses, these statutory exclusions are characterized as
"inferential rebuttal issues" which, if raised by the evidence, must be negated by the claimant
in order to prove his case. Id. at 428-30.
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committed by a third person. In this situation, the question posed is
whether the insurer is required to plead defensively the basis for the
statutory exclusion which would be applicable if the facts supported
the defensive theory.
Second, the claimant may plead sufficient facts to establish com-
pensability under the Act, but the carrier will wish to defend on the
basis of other facts arguably showing a statutory basis for exclusion.
The question raised concerns the specificity with which the carrier
must plead in order to properly present and preserve its theory of
defense. In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Monn,3 °3 the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals pointed out that a party is not entitled to
submission of any issue when it is raised only by general denial and
not by an affirmative written plea.3" At a minimum, Monn points to
the carrier's need to plead sufficiently to justify inclusion of a re-
quested issue in the court's charge, rather than rely on a general de-
nial to preserve its position. The extent of pleading required,
however, may be dependent on the facts of an individual case, includ-
ing the extent to which the claimant's pleading itself suggests facts
which would justify minimal defensive pleading in order to support a
requested instruction or issue.30
In Walters, the insurer did not rely on a simple general denial,
but pleaded that the injury did not occur in the course of the de-
ceased's employment.30 6 The defensive pleading did not specifically
refer to the basis for statutory exclusion on which the carrier relied,
but taken with the facts pleaded by the claimant, it might fairly be
assumed that the exclusion related to intentional assault by a third
person. The issue of the defensive pleading was discussed by the
supreme court during oral argument, but provided only a tangential
issue in the case since the point appealed from involved "no evidence"
and the carrier did not preserve any issue on the question of the trial
303. 643 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.); TEX. REV. CIV. P.
279.
304. Id. at 208.
305. In Walters, for instance, the court suggested that the insurer's failure to request an
instruction modifying the general course and scope of employment instruction narrowed the
focus of review to the threshold question. Since the jury was not instructed on the issue of
third-party assault, the court effectively held that the insurer waived the essential factual issue
underlying its no evidence point of error. 654 S.W.2d at 425, 427. See also Scott v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 572 S.W.2d 273, 277 (Tex. 1978) (judgment must be supported by
pleadings and evidence).
306. 654 S.W.2d at 425.
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court's charge in its appeal to the court of appeals. 30  The discussion
in oral argument did include issues related to the sufficiency of the
defensive plea filed by the insurer, as it might affect the sufficiency of
evidence to support the jury's finding that the employee was killed in
the course of his employment. Counsel for the insurer also suggested
that claimants might be required to plead negatively with respect to
statutory bases for exclusion, a posture that might be justified when
the pleading of the claimant includes facts that fairly raise an issue
relative to a statutory basis for exclusion of benefits.30
In theory, of course, an alternative burden of pleading could be
placed on insurers. The insurer could simply be held to the standard
of pleading defensively as in the case of affirmative defenses gener-
ally.3 °9 Since the parties have ample opportunity to investigate the
case and, in fact, the insurer will usually have investigated the facts
prior to counsel even entering the case, the requirement that the in-
surer definitively plead the statutory basis for exclusion and facts re-
lied upon not appear unduly burdensome. This approach appears
consistent with recognition that the insurer has the burden of proof
on the statutory exclusion, should the Texas Supreme Court ulti-
mately adopt that posture.
307. Id. at 425, 427. The Walters majority expressly noted:
The defendant, American States, did not object to the issue, the instruction, or the
burden of proof. American States did not request an instruction on that part of the
Workers' Compensation Act that excludes coverage for an injury caused by the act of
a third person intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him
and not directed against him as an employee, or because of employment. On appeal,
defendant American States focused on that provision. American States had no point
in the court of appeals complaining of the special issue or the instruction. The ques-
tion that was preserved and is now before us is whether the answer to the issue
submitted has support in the evidence.
Id. at 425 (citation omitted).
308. For example, if the claimant were to plead specifically that the employee was killed or
injured by lightning-an act of God-it might also be necessary for claimant to plead addi-
tional facts demonstrating his theory of liability in order to overcome a motion to dismiss. See
Whetro v. Awkerman, 383 Mich. 235, 174 N.W.2d 783 (1970) for a substantive discussion of
lightning and tornado cases. Similarly, the insurer in Walters, 654 S.W.2d 423, might have
specially excepted to claimant's general allegation that he was injured while in the course and
scope of his employment, forcing him to plead specifically.
309. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94. See generally Hess v. American States Ins. Co., 589 S.W.2d 548,
551 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ) (failure of employer to plead and request an
affirmative defense constituted a waiver of that defense); Digby v. Hatley, 574 S.W.2d 186
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ) (waiver is an affirmative defense and must be
pleaded).
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2. Special Issues Practice
General concerns of special issues practice are inapplicable to the
defensive issues of statutory exlcusions under the Act since these have
been characterized as "inferential rebuttal issues" on which special
issues are not to be submitted, pursuant to Rule 277 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.310 Instead of operating as affirmative de-
fenses which must be strictly pleaded or waived,31' these defensive
matters are to be considered in the overall context of whether injury
has been sustained in the course of employment.3 12 Thus, in Trans-
port Insurance Co. v. Liggins,31 3 a case involving the "act of God"
theory of exclusion, the court held that the issues relating to the de-
fensive theory of act of God and greater hazard of employee exposure
to such acts than suffered by the general public did not form the basis
for separate special issues.3" 4 Rather, the correct approach for the
trial court was to simply include the relevant instructions on these
issues in its definition instruction on course of employment.3" 5
Liggins is consistent with the approach taken by the pattern jury
instructions concerning intentional acts committed by third per-
sons.3 16 Those instructions direct that the defensive theory of third
party assault is to be incorporated in the course of employment issue
if raised by the evidence.317 If the issue is fairly raised by the plead-
ings and evidence, the trial court's refusal to modify the general in-
struction constitutes error, unless there is a failure to preserve
310. TEX. R. CIv. P. 277. But see Scott, 572 S.W.2d at 279 (definition of course and scope
of employment should incorporate statutory exclusion if raised by the pleadings and evidence);
2 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES PJC 21.10 (1970). The commen-
tary notes that the statutory exclusion should be included in the course of employment instruc-
tion issue and definition. But, if the general course of employment instruction is not given, a
special issue on the statutory defense is appropriate. Id. 21.21. The commentary further notes
that "in no case should the statutory defense be submitted" in modifying the "course of em-
ployment" instruction and as separate special issue. Id. 21.10. In Scott, however, the Texas
Supreme Court appears to have expressly rejected use of a special issue to place the issue of the
statutory exclusion before the jury. 572 S.W.2d at 279.
311. See, e.g., Hess, 589 S.W.2d at 551 (affirmative defenses are waived if not strictly pled);
Digby, 574 S.W.2d at 189. (affirmative defenses must be specifically pleaded or waived).
312. See supra note 310. See Dallas County v. Romans, 563 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1978, no writ); Farley, 566 S.W.2d at 681-82.
313. 625 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
314. Id.
315. Id.




In Walters, the insurer submitted the proposed modification of
the course of employment definition, but did not raise a point on ap-
peal based on the trial court's refusal to include the instruction in its
charge to the jury.319 Clearly, the trial court's action would be subject
to reversal upon a showing of evidence sufficient to raise an issue con-
cerning the motivation for the assault. However, the insurer
presented no evidence at trial demonstrating any motivation for the
assailant's attack and thus, offered no evidence to show that the kill-
ing of the employee was motivated by a reason personal to him, as
opposed to a motivation generally unrelated to employment viewed
from the assailant's perspective. Even had the latter standard been
adopted, the trial court's action was correct if the burden is properly
construed as the insurer's in requiring a showing of motivation not
related to employment.32 0  In the truly unexplained assault case, it
would appear that a total lack of evidence would preclude the modifi-
cation of the general instruction on course of employment unless the
statute is construed to place the burden on the employee to negate the
inference of a nonemployment related reason for the assault.
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN ALLOCATING THE
BURDEN OF PROOF
The relative lack of direction provided by the language of the
workers compensation statute with respect to the burden of proof in
unexplained accident and assault cases could have permitted the
Texas Supreme Court to fashion definitive rules in Walters.321 In ret-
rospect, it would appear that the court's effort with respect to acci-
318. Id. TEX. R. CIv. P. 273, 279, 274. See Walters, 654 S.W.2d at 425; Monn, 643
S.W.2d at 208-09.
319. The failure to preserve the issue on appeal constituted a waiver of any complaint that
the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury. Walters, 654 S.W.2d at 427.
320. In fact, the claimant in Walters moved for a partial instructed verdict on the issue of
insurer's failure to offer evidence demonstrating a nonemployment-related motivation for the
fatal assault. 654 S.W.2d at 425. The motion was orally granted by the trial court but the
written motion was inadvertently omitted from the record on appeal and never became a factor
in the subsequent decisions. Id.
321. Interestingly, the Walters majority focused on a narrow application of traditional
rules to the evidence presented at trial, forming its opinion in light of the issues raised-and
waived-by the insurer on appeal. See supra note 307. The concurring opinion, however,
applied the same principles against the claimant, but also suggested that the problem of the
burden of proof in unexplained assault cases justified adoption of a presumption favoring in-
jured employees. 654 S.W.2d at 430 (McGee J., concurring).
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dental deaths in Deatherage3 22 was subverted in part by the court's
failure to adopt a comprehensive policy toward the problems posed by
unexplained cases.3 2 3 At least three arguments suggest that the court
should fashion rules which place the burden of proof in unexplained
cases upon the insurer, conceding at the outset that in the truly unex-
plained cases, the insurer will almost certainly not be able to carry its
burden.
A. The Goal of Compensating all Meritorious Claims
The general goal of the workers' compensation statute is to pro-
tect employees while affording employers and their insurance carriers
a serious measure of protection against monetarily significant jury
verdicts in industrial accident cases.3 24 This goal is achieved by pro-
moting the resolution of claims through the administrative system,
permitting recourse to judicial determinations in those cases in which
genuine concern over the amount of award or legal justification for
board action precludes settlement. The Act provides that the courts
are to construe its provisions liberally in order to compensate merito-
rious claims,325 a reasonable legislative preference considering the loss
of alternative theories for litigation which are not available to the em-
ployee as a consequence of employer subscription to the Act.
3 2 6
The problem with unexplained cases is that any system of pre-
sumptions or allocation of burdens of proof will necessarily result in
either meritorious claims being denied or nonmeritorious claims being
compensated, depending upon the position taken by the courts. By
definition, unexplained cases will not be accurately resolved in all
322. See supra notes 270-74 and accompanying text.
323. The court could have extended the benefit of the presumption available in unex-
plained accident cases to include proof that the injury arose from a risk of employment, as well
as in the course of employment.
324. See generally New York Cent. Ry v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916) (upholding workers
compensation legislation against constitutional challenge).
325. See Walters, 654 S.W.2d at 430 (citing Huffman v. Southern Underwriters, 128
S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1939)).
326. Often, coverage under the Act may preclude an injured employee from pursuing far
more lucrative remedies available under negligence theory-particularly when the nature of
injury is more offensive than physically debilitating. Compare Arnold v. State, 94 N.M. 278,
609 P.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1980) (rape of resident employee of mental health facility by mentally
retarded student arose out of and in course of her employment and thus, her sole remedy was
under worker's compensation statute) with Smith v. Lannert, 429 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. Ct. App.
1968) (spanking of female employee by male supervisor not an accident arising from employ-
ment when employee was engaged in activity expressly forbidden by employer; thus, employee
was not barred from pursuing non-Act remedy of suit for assault and battery).
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cases precisely because the lack of factual evidence to explain the
cause of death or injury satisfactorily will necessarily inject an ele-
ment of randomness in the resolution of the legal issues involved. To
insure that meritorious claims will be awarded, the supreme court
should look to the necessity of resolving uncertain or unexplained
cases in favor of the injured worker or the deceased worker's benefi-
ciaries under the Act. The Blair court elected to rely on Oklahoma's
statutory preference of liberal construction designed to promote com-
pensation in holding that the employee, injured as a result of an unex-
plained assault, was entitled to benefits under the statute.
327
The goal of a liberal construction of the Texas Act would simi-
larly be best served by a judicial determination that unexplained cases
be resolved either by a presumption favoring injured workers,328 or




B. The General Problem of Unfairness in Requiring Proof of a
Negative
The trial of the unexplained accident or assault case is particu-
larly difficult because the lack of evidence of the essential fact-the
cause or motivation for the injury-producing event-precludes an
easy approach to the course of employment issue in the absence of an
instruction concerning the burden of proving potential bases for ex-
clusion of benefits.
The statute could simply be interpreted as requiring positive
proof of an employment-related motive for an assault; for instance,
the inclusion of the statutory defense as a modification of the course
of employment instruction fails to give the jury adequate direction as
to how to resolve a case in which the evidence is either conflicting, or
simply suggestive of alternative explanations which may be reason-
able.33° The lack of instruction is especially critical in this respect if
327. 496 P.2d 798. Oklahoma's Worker's Compensation Statute is found at OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 85, § I (West 1970).
328. See supra notes 26 & 293.
329. But see Walters, 654 S.W.2d at 429 (McGee, J., concurring) (citing McGrath, 485
S.W.2d at 593).
330. The instruction simply tracks the statute. 2 STATE BAR OF TExAS, TEXAS PATrERN
JURY CHARGES PJC 21.10, 21.21 (1970). The court of appeals noted in Walters:
In the instant case, the motive of Justice's assailant is unknown. The jury could
therefore could do no more than speculate and surmise between the competing theo-
ries on why appellant was murdered. Where evidence is in equipoise, that is in a
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some evidence suggests an alternative explanation in which joint mo-
tives for the assault may be present.
The lack of direct evidence concerning the assailant's motive in
an unexplained case, or the lack of probative testimony in a case in
which the assailant's identity may be known but information as to
motive is not, creates an unreasonable hurdle for a claimant forced to
discharge the burden of proving an employment-related motivation
for the assault. In effect, the only course of action for a claimant in
such a posture may be to attempt to disprove the existence of nonem-
ployment related motivation on the part of the assailant. This might
be accomplished in a case in which the assailant is identified with
direct testimony from the injured employee that no prior relationship
or animus existed between himself and his assailant. The denial of
antecedent malice in such a case might satisfy the burden, but only
provided the claimant's duty was to show that the motive was not
personal to him as an employee. If the burden is fixed on the assail-
ant's motive, as viewed from the assailant's perspective, even this live
testimony would probably be legally inadequate to discharge the bur-
den. Moreover, this possible approach would simply not be available
in the hardest unexplained cases, those in which the assault results in
the employee's death.
In a case in which the employee has suffered a fatal injury, the
lack of his testimony at trial precludes even establishing his lack of
knowledge of any motive which might have prompted his assailant's
attack. In this situation, the claimant can only sustain the burden of
proof by establishing the motive of the assailant as one either related
to employment, or one not unrelated to the employment relationship.
The latter possibility is predicated on a determination that the fact of
the employee's death occurs either at the workplace or while engaged
in furtherance of the employer's affairs, can be sufficient to show the
nexus between the employment and the injury, a position left in doubt
by the language of the McGrath opinion."'
The case law does demonstrate that in some cases insurers have
been able to develop evidence of antecedent malice existing between
state where the existence of a fact is no more probable than its nonexistence, there is
no evidence. Adams v. Smith, 479 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, no
writ); Calvert v. Union Producing Co., 402 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
636 S.W.2d at 797. The court erred in characterizing the evidence as presenting competing
theories, when, in fact, no theories of motive were suggested or argued by either side at trial.
331. 485 S.W.2d at 593.
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the employee and his assailant sufficient to avoid recovery for an in-
jury unrelated to the worker's employment.3 3 2 The allocation of the
burden of proof upon the insurer does not necessarily preclude the
insurer from discharging that burden in all cases, taking the claim
from the unexplained category, and providing enough evidence to ex-
plain the basis for the assault. By placing the burden on claimants,
the insurer's interest in investigating all aspects of the case will be de-
emphasized as the insurer comes to rely on the claimant's difficulties
in disproving the negative fact-that the injury was not sustained due
to an assault motivated by a reason other than the employee's work-
in preparing its case for trial.
A similar situation in which claimants consistently failed to over-
come an unfair burden of proof occurred in uninsured motorist ac-
tions. The applicable statute required the plaintiff policyholder to
show that the other motorist involved in the accident was uninsured
in order to recover against his own insurer under uninsured motorist
coverage.3 3 3 The burden was so great that considerable attention was
devoted to creation of legal fictions 334 designed to assist worthy claim-
ants and scholarly comment on the problem. 335 Eventually, the legis-
lature amended the statute to provide that the insurer could plead
defensively that the defendant motorist was, in fact, covered by insur-
ance at the time of the accident,33 6 a burden more easily discharged by
the industry in part because of accessibility to records of insurance
coverage. Ultimately, the unfairness of the burden of proving the neg-
ative placed upon claimants prompted redress in the legislative
332. See Upton, 492 S.W.2d at 627-28; Highlands, 485 S.W.2d at 596-97; Cogdill, 164
S.W.2d at 218-19; Vaughn, 130 S.W.2d at 394-96.
333. Home Indem. Co. v. Tyler, 522 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, writ refd n.r.e.); Stanfield v. Kroll, 484 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1972, writ reed n.r.e.). Both cases applied the general rule that plaintiff must establish
absence of insurance on part of defendant to recover against own insurer under uninsured
motorist policy coverage. See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Matlock, 462 S.W.2d 277
(Tex. 1970) (insured claiming benefits under uninsured motorist provision has burden of prov-
ing absence of insurance on attending vehicle and its driver).
334. In noting the difficulty in proving a negative, the court in Royal Indem. Co. v.
Senterfitt, 474 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, no writ), observed that the
plaintiff's burden was merely to establish convincing quantum of proof that all reasonable
efforts to ascertain existence of an applicable policy had been pursued and that such efforts had
proved fruitless.
335. See, e.g., Johnson, Proving Motorist Uninsured, 35 TEX. B.J. 337 (1972) (for discus-
sion of the Texas uninsured motorist statute).
336. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 5.06-1(7) (Vernon 1981) now provides: "If a dispute exists
as to whether a motor vehicle is uninsured, the burden of proof as to that issue shall be upon
the insurer." Id.
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branch which effected the goals attempted by the judiciary in its rec-
ognition of legal fictions designed to reduce the inherent unfairness in
the statutorily-created burden of proof.
In the case of the compensation statute, the language of the ex-
clusion provisions does not settle the burden of proof issue.3 37 Appro-
priate judicial action, rather than legislation, could properly remedy
current injustice resulting from the statutory ambiguity.33
C. Spreading the Cost of Compensating All Claims Throughout the
Industry
A final argument for allocating the burden of proving a statutory
basis for exclusion rests on the theory that costs of compensating un-
worthy claims should be spread throughout the industry. Rather
than rejecting worthy claims simply because problems of proof pre-
clude claimants from discharging their burden of proof, the goal of a
liberal interpretation of the Act would best be served by placing the
burden of proving the exclusion on the insurer. Even though this
would likely result in some unexplained cases being resolved improp-
erly in favor of compensation-assuming the explanations, if avail-
able, would support the insurer's claim for exclusion-the cost of
these cases would be spread over the entire industry, resulting in only
small incremental increases in premiums necessary to pay the cost.
The numbers of truly unexplained cases appears small and for the
most part, probably involves deaths of employees as a higher percent-
age of death cases than as a percentage of injury cases generally.
Death of the employee is likely to be a critical factor in the continued
support of his family unit defined by the Act to include his benefi-
ciaries.339 Thus, an uncompensated death case will tend to result in a
greater burden for the beneficiaries than an uncompensated injury
case in which the employee may be able to return to work or to en-
gage in continued work in a different job capacity. Resolving the bur-
den of proof problem to protect insurers from unworthy claims may
have the salutary effect of preventing the small increase in overall cost
necessary to compensate those claims, but the likelihood that worthy
337. Compare the conclusions drawn by the commentary to the pattern jury charges, the
court's opinion in McGrath, and Justice McGee's characterization of the McGrath opinion.
See supra notes 110-12.
338. Thus, the adoption of a presumption in unexplained accident cases, see supra note 26,
and the proposed presumption in unexplained assault cases, see supra note 293, are matters
properly within the scope of the judiciary's power.
339. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §§ 8(b), 8a (Vernon Supp. 1985).
[Vol. 16:875
UNEXPLAINED ACCIDENTS
claims will also fail poses far greater problems. The problems are, of
course, far greater for the family unit forced to live without statutory
benefits. They may also suggest societal costs in terms of increased
welfare payments required for sustaining the family unit until the in-
jured employee can return to work or, in the case of death of the
employee, significant long term costs necessary to maintain support
for the family unit.
The concept of spreading costs throughout the industry affected
by liberalization of tort law is not unique. In fact, it may be the single
most significant rationale for the expansion of the doctrine of strict
liability, particularly in products cases, and underlies the theory of
insurance. There is no just reason for recognition of rules unfavorable
to claimants under the workers compensation statute merely to avoid
increasing premium costs to employers necessary to compensate all
claims which are unexplained in nature. This is particularly true
since some or most of these costs would be justified by awards of bene-
fits were the cases not unexplained.
VII. CONCLUSION
The goal of this paper is to suggest the wide range of problems
associated with employee accidents and assaults which cannot be fully
explained in the context of the jury trial because of lack of evidence.
Significant problems are posed for both claimants and insurers at-
tempting to reconcile Texas case law in these unexplained accident or
assault cases, particularly when the employee has sustained a fatal
injury. The Texas Supreme Court should take the initiative to con-
front the problems associated with ill-defined or conflicting interpreta-
tions of the burden of proof in these cases and develop a unified,
cohesive approach to provide the plaintiff and defense bar with clear
guidelines for future litigation. The goal of a liberal construction of
the Act not only requires recognition of substantive rules designed to
afford optimal bases for recovery for injured workers or their benefi-
ciaries but also an approach which sets intelligible parameters for the
conduct of settlement negotiations and preparation for trial in con-
tested cases.
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